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REFORMING THE MISSISSIPPI CRIMINAL CODE PART III: PERSON-
ENDANGERING CRIMES AGAINST HABITATION AND PROPERTY:   
ARSON, BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND RELATED CRIMES 
 




This is the third in a series of articles advocating for change to the 
Mississippi criminal laws, which is a vital part of criminal justice reform.  
The first article explained why change is needed.1  Briefly, our criminal 
laws have been justifiably criticized2 because of gross sentencing 
disparities,3 vague definitions of the conduct prohibited,4 as well as 
confusing or absent definitions of states of mind required to commit the 
crime.  The criminal statutes are also often disorganized and do not relate 
to each other.5  
I have chaired the committee to reform the penal code for more than 
twenty years.6  We were originally appointed by the Mississippi Judicial 
Advisory Study Committee, which was established in 1993 by the 
legislature to improve the administration of justice.7  Our reform committee 
was officially entitled the Criminal Code Consulting Group [hereinafter 
referred to as the Committee] and was charged with suggesting revisions to 
the penal code.  We have been meeting since 1996, and we are finally 
reaching the end of our charge.  We hope to present our proposals to the 
 
    * Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law.  I want to thank all 
my research assistants who have provided valuable support over the years, especially my 
current research assistant Benjiman Blakely.  I also want to thank the Committee and 
Elizabeth Jones for editing assistance. 
    1. Judith J. Johnson, Why Mississippi Should Reform Its Penal Code, 37 
MISS. C. L. REV. 107 (2019).   
    2. Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill, and Usman Mohammed, The Five 
Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Northwestern U. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.3 
(2000) ranked the Mississippi Criminal Code as being the fifty-second worst criminal 
code in the U.S. The study included the federal code and the D.C. code in their 
assessments. Id.  
    3. See Johnson, supra note 1, at discussion accompanying notes 89-92. 
    4. See id. at discussion accompanying notes 67-72. 
    5. See id. at discussion accompanying notes 72-76. 
    6. See id. at 109. 
    7. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-21-1 (1993 Cumulative Supplement).  The Judicial 
Advisory Study Committee was eliminated in 2018. H.B. 949 (2018).  Our committee is 
now operating under the auspices of the Mississippi Supreme Court. 
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legislature in the foreseeable future.  The Committee is recommending a 
comprehensive change to the laws to alleviate some of the problems with 
the current code, described above and more comprehensively in my first 
article.8  The Committee proposals are an important part of criminal justice 
reform, and the purpose of these articles is to explain the Committee’s 
reasoning, as well as to present the proposed changes to the law.  These 
articles are intended to replace comments, which the Committee did not 
write, although there are extensive comments to the Model Penal Code on 
which these proposals are based.  
The first article introduced and explained the Committee’s process.9  
In addition the first article explained two important substantive areas of 
change, that is, states of mind and criminal homicide.10  The second article 
addressed the most serious crimes against the person, other than criminal 
homicide, and explained the Committee’s recommendations regarding 
assault and battery and related crimes, kidnapping and related crimes, and 
sex crimes.11  This article will cover crimes against habitation and property 
that involve danger to persons—arson, burglary, and robbery. Future 
articles will address other major groups of crimes.  
As will become clear in this article, these three crimes have been 
expanded by statutes, so that their original purpose of protecting persons 
from danger has degenerated into mostly protecting property.  
Unfortunately, the serious penalties attached to the original offenses often 
still apply,12 and all three of these crimes may form the basis for a felony-
murder charge, if a killing occurs in the commission of the crime.13  The 
Committee accepted the Model Penal Code’s guidance in returning these 
crimes to their purpose and grading less serious related offenses 
proportionally.14 
Section II of this article will briefly review the methodology of the 
Committee’s work; Section III will explain the proposed changes to arson 
and related offenses; Section IV will explain the proposed changes to 
robbery; Section V will explain the proposed changes to burglary and 
related crimes; and Section VI will conclude. 15 
 
 
    8. See Johnson, supra note 1.  
    9. See id. at II. 
  10. See id. at V.  
  11. See Judith J. Johnson, Reforming Mississippi’s Non-homicide Crimes 
Against the Person, 38 MISS. C. L. REV. 201 (2021).    
  12. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 4-5 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  13. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW, at 39 (2d. ed. 1969). 
  14. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  
  15. The appendix lists the Mississippi statutes that should be repealed by these 
proposals.  
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II. COMMITTEE METHODOLOGY AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE 
 
 As described more fully in the first article,16 the Committee has been 
meeting since 1996 and consists of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
legislative drafters, and law professors.17  The Committee has reviewed the 
most important parts of Title 97 of Mississippi Code of 1972, which 
contains the principal criminal statutes, working to develop a more 
comprehensive and coherent penal code.18   
As explained in more detail in the first article,19 the Committee 
meets monthly and uses the Mississippi Code, the Model Penal Code, as 
well as the laws of other states,20 to propose changes to the Mississippi law 
to reflect the needs of the state and to correct some of the deficiencies in 
the current code.21  
The Committee principally based the proposed revisions on the 
Model Penal Code [hereinafter the Model Code], which is discussed more 
fully in the first article. 22  The Model Code serves as a measure of 
uniformity among the majority of state codes that have reformed their penal 
codes, all based on the Model Code.23  
 
  16. See Johnson, supra note 1, at II.  
  17. Current committee members: Professor Judith J. Johnson, chair, Professor 
Matthew Steffey, reporter, Judge Donna Barnes, Judge John Emfinger, Greta Harris, 
Caryn Quilter, Professor Ronald J. Rychlak, Kathy Sones, Alison Steiner, Ed Snyder, 
and Gwynetta Tatum. See Johnson, supra note 1, at n.10 for prior members. 
  18. The Committee has been meeting in Jackson at the Mississippi College 
School of Law.  The law school has furnished the meeting space and paid the research 
assistant.  In addition, the law school also furnished lunch for the committee for several 
years under the leadership of Dean Jim Rosenblatt.  We are very grateful for the support 
of the law school during all these years.  The Administrative Office of the Courts has 
also furnished valuable support to the committee by sending out meeting notices and 
providing lunch for the committee for several years. 
  19. See Johnson, supra note 1, at II. 
  20. See infra note 288 and discussion accompanying notes 287-90. 
  21. The references to the minutes throughout usually reflect the Committee’s 
most recent review of the statute, although the Committee may have originally adopted 
the statute much earlier.  
  22. See Johnson, supra note 1, at III.  
  23. Gerald E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The 
Challenge of the Special Part, 2 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 297 (1998).  In addition to 
establishing some uniformity among criminal codes and crimes, virtually all-American 
law students are introduced to the Model Code and its version of general definitions, as 
well as many of its crimes and defenses.  Id.  Also, courts and commentators frequently 
cite the Model Code as persuasive authority.  Id.  Finally, the drafters wrote extensive 
comments, explaining the provisions of the Model Code in detail.  Although the 
comments will not be part of the legislation, lawyers, judges and courts often rely on the 
comments to interpret the Model Code provisions. Id. 
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The Model Code divides crimes by seriousness and punishes them 
accordingly, delineating three degrees of felonies,24 which the Committee 
expanded to four degrees.25  The Model Code recognizes misdemeanors but 
does not divide them according to seriousness.26  The Committee disagreed 
with this and divided misdemeanors into four classes, A-D.27 Finally the 
 
  24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  25. Section 6.01.  Minutes of the Consulting Grp. on Mississippi Criminal 
Code Revision, (September 12, 2014) [hereinafter cited as Minutes] (on file with the 
author). The minutes are unpublished but may be accessed by applying to the author. 
The proposed sentencing scheme for felonies is as follows:  
§ 6.06. Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to 
imprisonment, as follows: 
(a) in the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term the minimum of which 
shall be fixed by the Court at not less than twenty one year nor more than ten 
years, and the maximum of which shall be life imprisonment; 
(b) in the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term the minimum of 
which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than ten one year nor more than 
three years, and the maximum of which shall be ten twenty years; 
(c) in the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term the minimum of which 
shall be fixed by the Court at not less than one year, nor more than two years, 
and the maximum of which shall be five ten years; 
(d) in the case of a felony of the fourth degree, for a term the minimum of which 
shall be fixed by the Court, and the maximum of which shall be five years. 
 
Thus, murder is a felony in the first degree, MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(2) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1985), along with aggravated forms of rape, id. at § 213.1(1); robbery, 
id. at § 222.1(2), .and kidnapping, id. at § 212.1.  Manslaughter is a felony in the second 
degree, id at § 210.3(2), along with non-aggravated forms of rape, id. at § 210 (2); 
robbery, id. at § 222.1(2); kidnapping, id. at § 213.1(1).  Negligent homicide is a felony 
in the third degree, id. at § 210.4, along with non-aggravated burglary, and crimes of 
similar seriousness. id. at § 221.1(2).  The more serious theft crimes were classified as 
felonies in the fourth degree, Minutes, supra note 25 (September, 2012), along with 
others. See, e.g., less serious forms of Criminal Mischief, Minutes, supra note 25 (July, 
2020) and Obstruction, Minutes, supra note 25 (August 2019); as well as crimes such as 
Criminal Trespass, Minutes, supra note 25 (September 2018); Public Drunkenness 
Minutes, supra note 25 (March, 2012); and Disorderly Conduct, Minutes, supra note 25 
(March, 2012).  
  26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.08 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  27. See Minutes, supra note 25 (March, 2012; September, 2014).  The 
sentencing scheme for misdemeanors and violations is as follows: 
§ 6.08 
(a) Sentences of misdemeanors shall be a definite term of imprisonment in the 
county jail or to hard labor for the county, within the following limitations: 
(1) For a Class A misdemeanor, not more than one year. 
(2) For a Class B misdemeanor, not more than six months. 
(3) For a Class C misdemeanor, not more than three months. 
(4) For a Class D misdemeanor, not more than one month. 
(b) A violation is punished by a fine of not more than $200 $250. 
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Model Code classifies regulatory offenses as violations,28 which are not 
considered true crimes and thus not criminal.29  The Committee adopted the 
violation category.30 
As noted, the first article discussed mens rea and the most serious 
crimes against the person, the homicide crimes.31  The second article 
focused on non-homicide crimes against the person.32  This article will 
discuss other crimes that may endanger persons—arson, robbery, and 
burglary and related offenses.33  We will begin with arson and related 
crimes, which we adopted from the Model Code.  
 
III. ARSON AND RELATED OFFENSES 
 
In article 220, the Model Code recognizes three crimes that relate to 
destruction of property.34  The severity of the punishment depends on 
whether the property destruction also endangers persons.35  Arson36 and 
“causing or risking a catastrophe”37 are considered person-endangering.38  
 
  28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  29. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 113. 
  30. See Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2014). 
  31. See Johnson, supra note 1, at V.  
  32. See Johnson, supra note 11. 
  33. I want to explain how I dealt with statutes in this article.  If the statute is 
relatively short, I put it in the text.  If the statute is discussed fully in the text, but is too 
long to put in the text, I put the statute in the footnotes to avoid distracting the reader.  
Statutes that are long and not necessary to understanding the text were added to the 
appendix.   
We used basically the same numbers as the Model Code, even if we did not 
base the statute on the Model Code.  It is necessary, ultimately, to retain the Model Code 
numbering system because, as with other model acts, there are numerous internal cross-
references. I am distinguishing the sections that were not based on the Model Code by 
designating those with section numbers only.  If I am referring to the original version of 
the Model Code, I cited it, using the official citation form for the Model Code.  If we 
made changes to the original version, I added to the Model Code designation the 
following: “as adopted by the Committee” and added the reference to the minutes of the 
meeting where we adopted the changes.  If we made minimal changes to the Model 
Code, I indicated changes to Model Code with underlining and underlined strikeouts.  If 
we used the Mississippi statute as the basis for the proposed statute, Iindicated changes 
from the Mississippi statute in the same manner.  I also drew extensively on the Model 
Code comments, since these comments are very helpful in understanding the rationale of 
the proposed statutes, especially when we did not make many changes to the Model Code 
version.  
  34. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  35. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  36. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  37. Id. at § 220.2.  
  38. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 1-2 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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On the other hand, criminal mischief,39 the third crime in this article, is not 
considered person-endangering and may be punished as a much less serious 




Arson at common law was considered a serious felony because it 
posed a danger to people.  The crime was essentially the malicious burning 
of the dwelling of another,41 so it was considered a crime against habitation, 
along with burglary.42  Throughout the United States, statutory changes to 
arson transformed the offense into a property crime, often applying the 
offense to the burning of any property.  The offense, however, remained a 
serious felony, so that burning a crate of vegetables could be treated as 
seriously as burning a church.43 The Model Code sought to treat arson as it 
was treated under the common law, re-establishing that danger to persons 
should be the rationale for the most aggravated form of arson.  Arson, 
however, always presents a danger to firefighters, so the type of property 
burned must also be considered.44  If a person were actually harmed, other 
offenses such as aggravated assault45 or criminal homicide could be charged 
in addition to arson.46 
The Committee adopted the following version of arson with 
underlining to indicate additions and strike-outs to indicate deletions from 
the original Model Code: 
Section 220.1 Arson and Related offenses 
(1) Arson. A person is guilty of arson, as a felony in the second 
degree, if he starts a fire or causes an explosion with the purpose 
of (a) destroying a building or an occupied structure of another. 
b) destroying or damaging any property, whether his own or 
another’s, to collect insurance for such loss, if the actor’s 
conduct recklessly endangers any building or occupied structure 
of another or places any other person in danger of death or 
bodily injury. 
 
  39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  40. Id. at § 220.3.  There are other less serious offenses punishing property 
destruction.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.9 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (Desecration 
of Venerated Objects). 
  41. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  42. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 192.  
  43. See id. at 5. 
  44. See id. at 10. 
  45. See Johnson, supra note 1, at III.2 for an explanation of aggravated assault. 
  46. See Johnson, supra note 1 V. B. for an explanation of homicide crimes.  
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(2) Reckless Burning or Exploding. A person commits a felony in 
the third degree is guilty of arson, as a felony in the third degree, if 
he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own 
property or another’s and thereby recklessly: 
a) places another person in danger of death or bodily injury; 
or 
with the purpose of destroying or damaging any property, 
whether his own or another’s, to collect insurance for such a 
loss; or 
b) thereby recklessly places another person in danger of 
death or serious bodily injury; or 
c) thereby recklessly places an building or occupied 
structure of another in danger of damage or destruction.  
(3) Failure to Control or Report Dangerous Fire. A person who 
knows that a fire is endangering life or a substantial amount of 
property of another and fails to take reasonable measures to put out 
or control the fire, when he can do so without substantial risk to 
himself, or to give a prompt fire alarm, commits a misdemeanor if: 
(a) he knows that he is under an official, contractual, or other legal 
duty to prevent or combat the fire; or 
(b) the fire was started, albeit lawfully, by him or with his assent, or 
on property in his custody or control. 
(4) Definitions. “Occupied structure” means any structure, vehicle 
or place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or for 
carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is actually 
present. Property is that of another, for the purposes of this section, 
if anyone other than the actor has a possessory or proprietary 
interest therein. If a building or structure is divided into separately 
occupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied 
structure of another. 
 
 The conduct prohibited by the Model Code is starting a fire or 
causing an explosion.47 Because attempt under the Model Code is punished 
as severely as the crime intended in most cases, there is no need to add 
attempt to the statute, as some states have done.48  There is also no 
 
  47. MODEL PENAL CODE 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  48. At early common law, attempt to commit any crime was a misdemeanor.  
See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 213 n. 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  This idea of 
punishing all attempts as misdemeanors was carried over into American jurisdictions, in 
which attempt was often not punished with significant severity.  See generally WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW§ 11.2(a) (5th ed. 2010).  For example, at one time, a defendant 
could get the death penalty for rape but could be charged only with a misdemeanor for an 
attempted rape.  See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  In 
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requirement that the fire or explosion cause any damage.  The only 
requirement is that the actor started the fire or caused the explosion with 
the requisite state of mind.49   
 There are two subsections.  The first is a felony in the second 
degree;50 the second is a felony in the third degree.51  Under subsection (1), 
to be guilty of a felony in the second degree, the actor must be engaging in 
starting the fire or causing the explosion with the purpose of destroying an 
occupied structure of another.  If the fire or explosion is not intended to 
destroy this type of structure, the Committee thought that the offense should 
not be punished as the second degree felony of arson.52  In other words, if 
the purpose is just to damage an occupied structure, not to destroy it, the 
offense would not be punishable under this subsection.53  Similarly if the 
structure was not an occupied structure, as defined in section 220.0(1),54 the 
Committee did not think this subsection should apply.55  Subsection (2) or 
the crime of criminal mischief may apply to these situations, as discussed 
below.56 
 The Committee did not agree with the Model Code’s application of 
the offense to “a building”57 and confined liability under this subsection to 
 
addition, attempt required the defendant to come very close to commission of the target 
offense. Id. at 184.  The Model Code’s version of attempt, which the Committee adopted, 
Minutes, supra note 25 (October, November 1996), corrects both problems, punishing 
attempt as severely as the crime intended in most cases and requiring only a substantial 
step that strongly corroborates the defendant’s intent, rather than requiring the defendant 
to be close to success.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  In the case of 
arson, as a felony in the second or third degree, depending on the circumstances, attempt 
to commit arson would also be punished as a felony in the second or third degree.  See 
MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  49. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  51. Id. at § 220.1(2). 
  52. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 220.1, as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July, 
2020).  
  53. Id.  Under the original version of Section 220.1, damaging property to 
collect the insurance was punishable as a second degree felony, but the Committee 
moved this to subsection (2).  Id.  
  54. See infra note 59. 
  55. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE §220.1, as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July, 2020).  
  56. See infra note 120 and discussion accompanying notes 124-25. 
  57. There was no definition of “building” in arson.  In the comments, the 
drafters said that the idea of a building indicates it is suitable for occupancy, and if not 
the defense that it is abandoned is available.  See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 18 
(AM. LAW INST. 1980).  
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an “occupied structure of another.”58  The Committee adopted definitions 
that apply to this article in section 221.0, incorporating the definitions from 
former subsection 221.1(4), which the Committee deleted.59  In section 
221.0(1), “occupied structure” is defined as: 
 
any structure, vehicle, or place adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business 
therein, whether or not a person is actually present. If a 
building or structure is divided into separately occupied 
units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied 
structure of another.60  
  
This clarifies that the most serious form of arson is directed at protecting 
people from danger, even though the definition of “occupied structure” 
does not require that a person actually be present.  Even without a person 
present, because the structure is capable of having persons present, the same 
danger may be contemplated.  Also, it is more likely that firefighters will 
be engaged in more dangerous efforts to ensure that there are no persons 
present and to put out the conflagration in such a structure.61  
 
  58. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1, as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July, 2020).  
  59. Id.  Section 220.0 Arson, Criminal Mischief, and Other Property 
Destruction 
The following definitions apply to this Article: 
(1) “occupied structure” means any structure, vehicle, or place adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein, 
whether or not a person is actually present. If a building or structure is divided 
into separately occupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied 
structure of another.  
(2) Property or structure of another, for the purposes of this article, will 
include anyone other than the actor who has a possessory or proprietary interest 
therein.  
(3) “Property,” for purposes of this article, is property that is capable of 
being touched or , as distinguished from intangible property, which has intrinsic 
or marketable value, not just but is merely the representative or evidence of 
value.  
(4) Catastrophe means serious physical injury to ten (10) or more 
people or substantial damage to five (5) or more occupied structures. 
(5) In this Article, the definitions given in Section 210.0 apply unless a 
different meaning plainly is required. 
MODEL PENAL CODE §220.0(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985), as adopted by the 
Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  60. Id. at §220.0(1). 
  61. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 220 cmt. at 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  The definition is now contained in the separate 
definition section proposed by the Committee.  See supra note 59. 
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 Under the common law, the actor could not be guilty of burning his 
own property.62  The Model Code also imposes this limitation with 
modifications, which the Committee expanded upon.  Property of another, 
however, includes “anyone other than the actor who has a possessory or 
proprietary interest therein.”63  Thus, if the actor is the owner but intends to 
burn a structure leased to a tenant, he should be liable under this subsection.  
Similarly, if the actor is the lawful tenant, but not the owner, he would be 
liable.64  The actor’s liability for damaging his own property by fire or 
explosion is addressed by other provisions, in this or other statutes, such as 
intending to defraud the insurer65 or intending to kill occupants or acting 
with reckless indifference to the lives of occupants.66 
However, under section (1), the purpose must be to destroy the 
“occupied structure,” not just the property of another.67  The Committee 
was concerned that this would exclude from coverage the actor who burns 
his own occupied structure to spite one who has an interest in the home.68  
The original Model Code description of “property of another” in Section 
220.0(2) did not include “structure,” so if the actor burned his own home to 
disadvantage his soon-to-be divorced-wife, he would not be guilty of arson 
under section 220.1(1).69  To avoid this result, the Committee added 
“structure of another” to this description,” so that burning of ones’ own 
occupied structure would be the first degree felony of arson, if another 
person had an interest in the structure.70  This change would also apply to 
section 220.1(2), if the actor recklessly endangered an occupied structure 
of another.71 
In addition, by operation of part of the definition of occupied 
structure, section 220.1(1)72 provides for liability for intending to destroy 
 
  62. Id.  
  63. Id. at § 220.0(3).  This definition was taken from deleted subsection (4). 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  See supra note 59 and 
discussion accompanying notes 59 and 98. 
  64. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 22 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  65. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1(2) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  66. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 23 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  67. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  68. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  69. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  70. Id. at §220.0(3).  This definition was taken from deleted subsection (4).  
MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1 (4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  See supra note 59 and 
discussion accompanying notes 59 and 98. 
  71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2) as adopted by the Committee.  See 
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 2020). 
  72. This definition was also adapted from subsection (4), which the Committee 
deleted. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
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separately occupied portions of the structure, not occupied by the arsonist.73  
This is to be sure, first, that arson applies only to the structure of another, 
as discussed above,74 and also that if the actor intended to burn a separate 
apartment or hotel room, for example, section 220.1(1) could apply.75  The 
subsection was not designed, however, to allow multiple counts of arson if 
an apartment building with separate units is burned or intended to be 
burned.  Each unit would not be a separate count, so that intending to burn 
the entire structure or multiple units would be a single count of arson.76 
The original Model Code version of the second degree felony of 
arson added the purpose of collecting insurance for the loss, if persons or 
occupied structures were endangered.77  The Committee decided to punish 
this conduct under subsection (2) as a felony in the third degree, as 
discussed below.78   
Thus, subsection (2), among other things, requires the actor to 
purposely start a fire or cause an explosion, on his own property or that of 
another.79 In addition, he must have the purpose of collecting insurance, or 
 
  73. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.0(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1985), as added by the 
Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  74. See supra note 63 and discussion accompanying notes 63-71. 
  75. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(1) as added by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 2020).   
  76. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 22 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  78. See infra note 79 and discussion accompanying notes 87-89.  
  79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985), as adopted by the 
Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).   
The Committee adopted the Model Code’s definition of “purposely”: 
(a) Purposely. 
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, 
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause 
such a result; and 
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of 
the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they 
exist. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  Minutes, supra note 
25 (March, 2018).  See Johnson, supra note 1, at V.A. for an explanation of section 2.02.  
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he must recklessly80 endanger another person or an occupied structure of 
another.81  
We added arson to defraud insurers to subsection (2)(a) so that 
purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion to collect insurance, 
whether it is the actor’s property or property of another, is a third degree 
felony, rather than a second degree felony, which was in the original version 
of the Model Code.82  This conduct would otherwise be theft by deception,83 
which is punished as a fourth degree felony, as adopted by the Committee, 
depending on the value of the property.84  
The Committee wanted to limit the second degree felony of arson 
in subsection (1) to intentional conduct that endangered persons.85  
Subsection (2) is not so limited. It applies to any property, not just occupied 
structures addressed in subsection (1).  The subsection also applies whether 
it is the actor’s property or that of another.86 
The original version of the Model Code limited the liability for 
insurance fraud under Section 220.1 to situations that recklessly endanger 
persons or occupied structures.87  The Committee moved that subsection to 
subsection 2(a) and did not limit it to a particular type of property. Thus, 
the subsection would apply to burning merchandise to collect insurance, for 
 
  80. The Committee adopted the Model Code’s definition of “recklessly” in 
Section 2.02: 
(c) Recklessly. 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when 
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material 
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature 
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and 
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from 
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's 
situation. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  Minutes supra note 
25 (March, 2018).  See Johnson supra note 1, at V.A. for an explanation of section 2.02. 
  81. Id.  
  82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(1) & (2) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(h) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes 
supra note 25 (January 14, 2000). 
  84. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.3 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes 
supra note 25 (March 8, 2000).  
  85. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  
  86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2).  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  87. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) 
(original version) with MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1(2)(a) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  
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example.88  Subsection (2) is also not limited to intent to destroy the 
property, but includes the purpose to damage the property, whether the 
actor’s own or another’s with the purpose of collecting insurance for the 
loss.89 
The last two subsections of subsection (2) revert to the original 
purpose of arson and, that is, to prevent danger to persons.90  Subsection 
2(b) requires that the actor, in addition to having the purpose of starting a 
fire or causing an explosion, recklessly place another in danger of death or 
bodily injury.91  The Committee decided to require that the bodily injury 
must be “serious” bodily injury.92   
To be guilty of arson under subsection 2(c), in addition to the 
prohibited purpose, the actor must recklessly place an occupied structure of 
another in danger of damage or destruction.93  This is as opposed to the 
requirement of subsection (1) that the actor act with the purpose of 
destroying the occupied structure of another.94 
 
  88. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.1(2)(a) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  89. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2)(a) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  90. See supra discussion accompanying notes 41-46. 
  91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
  92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(b) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).   
The Committee incorporated the definitions in section 210.0 into this article, as 
well as articles 220 and 221.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(5) as adopted by the 
Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
§ 210.0. Definitions. 
In Articles 210-213, unless a different meaning plainly is required: 
(1) “human being” means a person who has been born and is alive; 
(2) “bodily injury” means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical 
condition; 
(3) “serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of 
death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ; 
(4) “deadly weapon” means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, 
material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is 
used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or 
serious bodily injury. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra 
note 25 (April, 2018).   
  93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(c) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  
  94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).   
250 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 39:2 
The Model Code included two other subsections, which the 
Committee decided not to adopt.95  We decided that failure to report or 
control a fire should not be criminalized, absent other elements.96 Similarly, 
the Committee did not generally believe that failure to report should be 
criminalized, following the Anglo-American tradition of not penalizing 
omissions.97  Therefore, the Committee is not recommending the adoption 
of subsection (3).  In addition, as noted earlier, the Committee deleted the 
definition section (4) and incorporated it into a separate definition section, 
which applies to all of the statutes in this article, including the next section, 
“causing a catastrophe.”98 
 
B. Causing A Catastrophe. 
 
The Committee adopted some of the Model Code’s version of “causing or 
risking a catastrophe;”99 however, we simplified, renamed and substantially 
reorganized it.100  We retained some of the same ideas, especially with 
regard to “causing a catastrophe”; however, we do not propose to impose 
liability for “risking a catastrophe” in this section or for failure to prevent a 
catastrophe.  This is the version of Section 220.2 that the Committee 
adopted: 
 
  95. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(3) & (4) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(3).  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
  97. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 33 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
  98. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (original 
version) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(2) & (3) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  
  99. § 220.2. Causing or Risking Catastrophe. 
(1) Causing Catastrophe. A person who causes a catastrophe by explosion, fire, 
flood, avalanche, collapse of building, release of poison gas, radioactive 
material or other harmful or destructive force or substance, or by any other 
means of causing potentially widespread injury or damage, commits a felony of 
the second degree if he does so purposely or knowingly, or a felony of the third 
degree if he does so recklessly. 
(2) Risking Catastrophe. A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he recklessly 
creates a risk of catastrophe in the employment of fire, explosives or other 
dangerous means listed in Subsection (1). 
(3) Failure to Prevent Catastrophe. A person who knowingly or recklessly fails 
to take reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate a catastrophe commits a 
misdemeanor if: 
(a) he knows that he is under an official, contractual or other legal duty 
to take such measures; or 
(b) he did or assented to the act causing or threatening the catastrophe. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
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Section 220.2 Causing a Catastrophe  





(e) collapse of building; 
(f) poison gas; 
(g) radioactive material; or 
(h) any other means causing potentially widespread injury 
or damage 
commits a felony of the second degree if he does so purposely or 
knowingly, or a felony of the third degree if he does so recklessly.101  
 
“Causing a catastrophe” is a crime that was unknown at common 
law, but it comports with the idea that underlies the crime of arson, 
punishing contemplated property destruction that presents a danger to 
persons.102  In the case of section 220.2, the actual widespread property 
destruction contemplated here would be dangerous to life.103  If actual harm 
to persons occurs, other criminal provisions would also apply.104 
The Model Code chose not to define the word “catastrophe,” so the 
Committee adopted the following definition in section 220.0(4), which was 
cited in the Model Code comments and used by other states:105  
 
(4) Catastrophe means serious physical injury to ten (10) or more 
people or substantial damage to five (5) or more occupied 
structures.106 
 
The methods of causing a catastrophe are listed and given an alphabetical 
designation in our version, as opposed to the Model Code, which provided 
a narrative listing of the methods without enumerating them.107  The 
 
101. Id. 
102. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 35-36 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
103. See id. 
104. For example, if a person were killed, this could be murder under section 
210.1 for acting recklessly with extreme indifference to the value of human life.  MODEL 
PENAL CODE §210.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 37 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
106. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(4) as added by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
107. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 220.2 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 
2020). 
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original Model Code version of section 220.2(1) appeared wordy and too 
complex, so the Committee chose to list the methods.  However, the 
methods listed by the Committee and those specified in section 220.2 of the 
Model Code are the same.108 
Consistent with the mens rea for arson, if the actor causes the 
catastrophe purposely or knowingly,109 he is guilty of a second degree 
felony.110  If he is does so recklessly, he is guilty of a third degree felony.111  
The punishments are consistent with the Model Code in this regard.112 
The Committee did not adopt the remainder of the Model Code 
section.  Section 220.2(2) would punish as a misdemeanor “risking a 
catastrophe.”113  The Committee thought that this would be difficult to 
apply when the catastrophe did not occur.114  If the actor was intending to 
cause a catastrophe and took a substantial steps toward that end, he would 
be guilty of attempt.115 Otherwise the Committee did not believe that 
“risking a catastrophe” could be fairly applied.116  
The last subsection, subsection (3), of the original version of the 
Model Code would punish failure to prevent a catastrophe.117  As with the 
rejected “duty to report” in Section 220.1,118 the Committee did not believe 
that creating a new duty to prevent a catastrophe, which would include one 
 
108. Id. 
109. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE §220.2 as adopted by 
the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
110. The Committee adopted the Model Code’s § 2.02 definition of knowingly 
as follows:  
(b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a 
material element of an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the 
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that 
nature or that such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware 
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a 
result. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  Minutes, supra note 25 
(Dec. 2006).  See Johnson, supra note 1, at V. A. for a discussion of section 2.02. 
111. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  
112. See supra note 52. 
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).   
114. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
115. See supra note 48 and accompanying discussion. 
116. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).   
118. See supra note 96 and discussion accompanying notes 97-98. 
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not of the actor’s making, was a beneficial addition to the criminal law.119  
Other than failure to report and failure to prevent a catastrophe, some of the 
other ideas rejected by the Committee in Sections 220.1 and .2 are covered 
by criminal mischief, which will be considered next.  
 
C. Criminal Mischief 
 
Criminal mischief is the last crime in this article of the Model Code.  
The Committee adopted almost all of the Model Code version of this crime, 
except for the stricken and underlined portions,120 as follows:  
 
Section 220.3 Criminal Mischief.  
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he: 
(a) damages property of another purposely, recklessly, or by 
criminal negligence in the employment of fire, explosives, or other 
dangerous means listed in Section 220.2(1); or 
(b) purposely or recklessly tampers with tangible property of 
another so as to endanger person or property. 
(c) purposely or recklessly causes another to suffer pecuniary loss 
by deception or threat 
(2) Grading. Criminal mischief is a felony in the third degree if the 
actor purposely causes pecuniary loss in excess of $5000, or a 
substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, 
transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other public 
service. It is a Class A misdemeanor if the actor purposely or 
recklessly causes pecuniary loss in excess of $100. , or a petty 
misdemeanor if he purposely or recklessly causes pecuniary loss in 
excess of $25 The pecuniary losses caused by the same actor may 
be aggregated. Otherwise criminal mischief is a violation Class D 
misdemeanor.121 
 
 Criminal mischief is derived from the common law misdemeanor of 
malicious mischief, which required maliciously damaging tangible 
property of another.122  As opposed to the other two crimes in this article, 
 
119. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
120. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 220.3 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 
2020). 
121. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
122. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art. 220 cmt. at 41 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  The 
Model Code did not use the term malicious, as discussed in my first article, preferring to 
use more exact terms for mens rea.  See Johnson, supra note 1, at 116. 
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criminal mischief is mostly a property crime, not primarily contemplating 
injury to persons.123  
 Criminal mischief takes up where “causing a catastrophe” and arson 
stop because the offense requires damage only to property, not widespread 
property destruction or intent to start a fire or cause an explosion that could 
endanger persons.124  Criminal mischief under section 220.3 is a catchall 
offense that supplements several other types of interference with property 
not covered by theft, forgery or fraud, as well as arson.125  
There are three parts, (a), (b) and (c), under the original Model Code 
section 220.3(1), but the Committee is only recommending parts (a) and 
(b).126  Both of these parts recommended by the Committee apply to 
“tangible property.”  The Model Code did not define property in this 
section, so the Committee added the following definition in section 
220.0(3):  
 
Property, for purposes of this article, is property that is capable of 
being touched or which has intrinsic or marketable value, as 
distinguished from intangible property, which has no intrinsic and 
marketable value not just merely the representative or evidence of 
value.127 
 
This definition distinguishes the property capable of damage under section 
220.3 from intangible interests in property, such as contract rights.  Property 
under this article is thus not as broadly defined as property is defined under 
the theft article, which is “anything of value.”128  Thus, criminal mischief, 
as conceived by the Committee, is limited to damage to physical property, 
leaving damage to other property interests to the civil law or to other articles 
of the Model Code.129 
 
123. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 40 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
124. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(1) & (2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) 
with MODEL PENAL CODE §220.0(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
125. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 42 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(3) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  Although subsection 220.3(1)(a) does not use the term 
“tangible” property, that is what is clearly intended because only tangible property could 
be damaged by fire or explosion.  See supra note 59. 
127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(3) as added by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
128. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 43 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
129. See id.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
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 In addition, the offense, as proposed by the Committee, applies only 
to property of another, as discussed above with regard to arson.130  Property 
of another is property that another has title to, or possession of, other than 
the actor.131  Therefore, the actor may be guilty of criminal mischief for 
damaging property of another, even if he has title to the property but another 
has possession, or if he has possession and another has title.132 
Subsection (1)(a) requires that the actor damage property by “fire, 
explosives, or other dangerous means listed in section 220.2.”133  As 
opposed to arson, which requires only that the actor start a fire or cause an 
explosion to purposely destroy an occupied structure, subsection (1)(a) 
requires that the actor actually damage property of another purposely, 
recklessly or by criminal negligence.134 
The drafters of the Model Code generally did not believe that 
criminal negligence135 should be sufficient to be criminal, except in very 
limited situations.136  This was one of those limited situations. If the actor 
is employing a dangerous means and falls substantially below a reasonable 
person standard, he should be liable for damaging property of another.137  
However, the drafters thought that the actor should be guilty of only a 
violation, if he is merely criminally negligent.138  As discussed further 
 
130. See supra note 61 and discussion accompanying notes 61-79.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
131. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0(2) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
132. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE §220.3(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
133. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
134. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE §220.3(1) as adopted 
by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
135. The Committee adopted the Model Code’s definition of “negligently” 
renaming it “criminally negligently.”: 
(d) Criminally Negligently. 
A person acts criminally negligently with respect to a material element of an 
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such 
a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature 
and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the actor's situation. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  Minutes, supra note 25 
(July 10, 2020).  See Johnson supra note 1, at V. A. for a discussion of § 2.02. 
136. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 47 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
137. See id.  See Johnson, supra note 1, at 118-19 for a discussion of criminal 
negligence. 
138. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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below, the Committee changed this punishment to a Class D 
misdemeanor.139 
Subsection (1)(a) applies only to the actor who damages the 
property of another, which means that there must be some physical harm to 
the property.140  If the actor intends to harm the property, but has not done 
so, he could be guilty of attempt or of tampering under subsection (1)(b).141 
Under subsection (1)(b), the actor is liable if he endangers a person 
or property by purposely or recklessly tampering with the property of 
another.142  Tampering would include such actions as disabling a fire alarm 
so that persons or property would be endangered.  Actual harm would not 
have to occur under this subsection.143 
 The third type of criminal mischief recognized by the Model Code 
in subsection (1)(c) applies to an actor who causes pecuniary loss by 
deception or threat.144  Along with most other states, the Committee did not 
think that subsection (1)(c) belonged in this article.145  The subsection was 
intended to cover conduct not previously criminalized, such as practical 
jokes carried too far.146  The Committee thought that the conduct prohibited 
could be applied too broadly and could be difficult to distinguish from 
legitimate business transactions.  In addition, we believed that the conduct 
was sufficiently dealt with in other articles that are more related to threats 
or deception causing loss.147   
 Although criminal mischief is primarily a property crime, the 
penalty may be severe, depending on the actor’s state of mind and the type 
of damage. If the property damage is caused purposely and the pecuniary 
loss is in excess of $5000 or causes a substantial disruption to public 
services, such as communication, transportation, water, gas or power 
supply, the offense is a third degree felony.148  
 
139. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  See infra note 151 
and discussion accompanying notes 151-53. 
140. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 47 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
141. See id.  
142. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
143. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 49 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
144. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (original Model 
Code version.) 
145. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 50 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
146. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  The 
example in the comments is sending a telegram giving false information that the 
recipient’s mother is dying, so that he spends money to rush to her side.  
147. Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 
Article 224 Forgery and Fraudulent Practices (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
148. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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The purposeful interruption of public services is obviously 
deserving of a greater penalty. In addition, the Committee thought that 
purposely causing pecuniary loss in excess of $5000 should be punished 
more severely than theft of the same amount of property because of the 
more serious conduct involved.149  If the actor is only reckless in the 
employment of a dangerous means or tampers with property so as to 
endanger persons or property, the Committee classified this as a class A 
misdemeanor if the loss is more than $100.150  
The Committee made other changes to the Model Code scheme at 
this point. If the loss is less than $100, regardless of how much less, or if 
the actor is criminally negligent under subsection (1)(a), criminal mischief 
is a Class D misdemeanor,151 as opposed to a violation, as originally 
envisioned by the Model Code.152  The Committee also specifically 
provided for aggregation of pecuniary losses.153  
The Committee decided to incorporate a part of the Mississippi 
statute into this article, requiring the actor to pay for the cost of fire 
suppression, as follows:   
 
D. Paying for Cost for Fire Suppression 
 
 The Committee thought that requiring the actor to pay for the cost 
of his crime was justified and a beneficial addition to the punishment.  The 
Committee is proposing the addition of the following section of a 
Mississippi arson statute.154  The only change the Committee made was 
with regard to whether the penalty is mandatory or discretionary. The 
Committee thought the extra penalty should be discretionary, as follows: 
 
Section 220.X Reimbursement to Fire Suppression Agency 
In addition to the penalties provided in this section, upon conviction, 
a person shall may be ordered to reimburse and pay in restitution 
 
149. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with 
MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  Theft is a fourth degree felony if 
the amount exceeds $1000.  MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1(3) as adopted by the 
Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (March 8, 2019). 
150. MODEL PENAL CODE §220.3(2) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  
151. Id. 
152. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 
(July 10, 2020). 
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
154. MISS. CODE ANN. §97-17-13(3).  See Appendix A for the full Mississippi 
statute, which should be repealed. 
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directly to any organized fire suppression agency recognized by the 
Mississippi Forestry Commission all the costs the agency incurred 
related to the suppression and abatement of the fire.155  
 
 Robbery is the next crime that blends property and person-




Robbery at common law was a serious crime because it was theft 
committed by force or threat, in other words, by terrorizing the victim.156  
The drafters thought that robbery should still be considered a serious crime 
because of the element of terror and danger to persons, in combination with 
the theft or attempted theft.157  These offenses could be separately punished, 
but the drafters thought that robbery deserved separate and serious 
treatment because the actor “generates severe and widespread insecurity by 
indiscriminately assailing anyone who may be despoiled of property.”158  
Also, robbery has a long tradition in the criminal law, even if it could be 
broken into separate offenses.159  The principal problem the drafters 
addressed was defining and grading various forms of threats.160 
The Committee adopted the substance of the Model Code provision 
regarding robbery, but rearranged, refined, and  made some important 
changes to the crime.161  Some of the changes to the Model Code, but not 
all—since the statute was substantially re-written—are indicated by 
underlining and strikeouts.  The original Model Code version of the crime 
is provided in the footnotes for comparison purposes.162  The version of 
robbery that the Committee is recommending is as follows: 
 
155. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.0, as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
156. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 96 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
157. See id. at 98. 
158. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 116 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
159. See id.  
160. See id. at 98-99. 
161. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 
2020). 
162 § 222.1. Robbery. 
(1) Robbery Defined. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of 
committing a theft, he: 
(a) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(b) threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate 
serious bodily injury; or 
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Section 222.1 Robbery 
(1) A person is guilty of robbery, as a first degree felony if, in the 
course of committing a theft, he: 
 (a) attempts to kill another; or 
 (b) purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily 
injury upon another.  
(2) A person is guilty of robbery, as a second degree felony if, in the 
course of committing a theft, he: 
 (a) recklessly inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(b) threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of 
immediate serious bodily injury; or  
(c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony 
of the first or second degree.  
(3) A person is guilty of robbery, as a third degree felony if, in the 
course of committing a theft he:  
 (a) recklessly inflicts bodily injury upon another; or   
(b) threatens to inflict serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony 
not of the first or second degree; or 
 (d) takes property from another by force.  
An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a theft” under 
sections (1), (2) or (3) if it occurs in an attempt to commit a theft, as 
defined under Section 223.1, or in flight after the attempt or 
commission.  
(4) A person is guilty of robbery, as a fourth degree felony, if he 
purposely obtains property of another by threatening to: 
 (a) inflict serious bodily injury, as defined by section 210.0; 
or 
(b)(a) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other 
criminal offense; or 
 (c) (b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or 
(d) (c)expose any secret tending to subject any person to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or 
business repute; or 
 
(c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first 
or second degree. 
An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a theft” if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission. 
(2) Grading. Robbery is a felony of the second degree, except that it is a felony 
of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to 
kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
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(e) (d)take or withhold action as an official, or cause an 
official to take or withhold action; or  
(f) (e) bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other 
collective unofficial action if the property is not demanded 
or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the 
actors purports to act; or 
(f) testify or provide any information or withhold testimony 
or information with respect to another’s legal claim or 
defense; or  
(g) (g) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the 
actor that would not in itself substantially benefit the actor 
but that is calculated to harm substantially another person 
with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, 
financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships. 
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraph (b), 
(c), (d), (e), (f) or (g) that the property obtained by threat or 
accusation, exposure, lawsuit, or other invocation or official action 
was then honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm 
done in the circumstances to which such accusation, exposure, 
lawsuit, or other official action relates, or as compensation for 
property or lawful service.163 
 
The original Model Code version of article 222 contains one 
section, section 222.1, which proscribes robbery.164  The Committee added 
a definition section to article 222165 and broke robbery into four degrees of 
felonies, as opposed to the Model Code’s two degrees.166  
Under the original version of the Model Code, robbery requires 
threat or force in the course of a theft.  The seriousness of the punishment 
depends on the actor’s state of mind and how serious the threat or force is.  
Robbery under the Model Code may be a first or second degree felony.167  
The Committee agreed with this version of the first and second degree 
felonies.  However, the Committee expanded on this, so that robbery may 
 
163. MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra 
note 25 (July 10, 2020; August 14, 2020). 
164. See supra note 162. 
165. Section 222.0 Definitions. 
In this Article, the definitions given in Section 210.0 and Section 223.0 apply 
unless a different meaning plainly is required. 
MODEL PENAL CODE §222.0 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 
10, 2020). 
166. Minutes, supra note 25 (July10, 2020). 
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
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be an offense in the first, second, third or fourth degree.168  The common 
thread is that the force or threat must be “in the course of a theft” for all 
degrees, except for fourth degree robbery.169  As discussed below, fourth 
degree robbery was extracted from the theft article and is the Model Code’s 
version of extortion.170  
Theft under the Model Code171 consolidates into a single theft crime 
all the common law theft crimes—larceny, embezzlement and false 
pretenses—as well as related offenses, such as extortion, blackmail and 
receiving stolen property.172  The conduct required is broken down into 
several sections under the Model Code.173  The Committee chose to 
consolidate the offense into one section of theft with several subsections 
that roughly correspond to the Model Code sections.174  Because robbery 
under subsections (1), (2) and (3) requires a theft, it could be accomplished 
by any of the conduct prohibited under the theft section, section 223.1(2), 
as proposed by the Committee.175  Generally, robbery is accomplished in 
the course of committing larceny,176 but under the consolidated theft 
provision, theft could be committed in any manner defined as such.177  
Since robbery could be committed in the course of attempted theft or flight, 
it is possible that one committing theft by embezzlement, for example, 
could be guilty of robbery, if thwarted in his attempt or flight.178 
Because common law larceny required the actor to actually take 
possession and carry away property of another with the intent to steal it, if 
the actor only attempted to obtain property, he would not be guilty of 
 
168. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
169. Id.  
170. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 
2020). 
171. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
172. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 122 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
173. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
174. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (January, 2019). 
175. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (January, 2019).  This was not expressed in the Model Code version, so the 
Committee added in section 222.0(2) that the definitions of the theft article 223 apply to 
article 222.  We also added in section 222.1 that theft is defined in article 223.  MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 
2020; August 14, 2020.). 
176. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1046-47. 
177. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (January, 2019). 
178. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
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larceny or, necessarily, of robbery.179  Such conduct presents the same 
danger to persons, whether property is actually obtained or not.  Thus, if the 
prohibited conduct occurs in the attempt to commit a theft, the actor should 
be guilty of robbery.180  Unlike the common law, which punished any 
attempt as a misdemeanor, attempt under the Model Code is punished the 
same as the crime intended.181  However, the exception to that rule is that, 
if the intended offense is a felony in the first degree, attempt is a second 
degree felony.182  Punishing an attempted theft as robbery allows first 
degree punishment for what would otherwise be attempted robbery, if the 
remaining elements of the offense are met. 
In addition, because some forms of robbery require only 
recklessness, and attempt requires purposefulness, applying attempt to all 
the elements of robbery could be problematic.183  Defining attempted theft 
as robbery requires purposefulness only with regard to the theft, not to all 
of the elements of robbery.184  Therefore, if the actor intends to commit a 
theft, takes a substantial step toward that end, and in the process recklessly 
inflicts serious bodily injury, he is guilty of robbery, not just attempted theft 
and assault.185 
Another issue that must be addressed is that the theft article provides 
for a general claim-of-right defense, which allows an affirmative defense 
when, among other things, the actor honestly believes that he has a claim to 
the property.186  This may seem redundant because the actor has to 
purposely obtain property of another in some way, so that if his belief is 
mistaken that the property is his and not that of another, he would not be 
guilty of theft.  The claim of right defense operates to reinforce that the 
actor has a defense for the theft element of robbery if he acts in the mistaken 
 
179. See LAFAVE supra note 48, at 1048. 
180. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 99-100 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
181. See supra note 48. 
182. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
183. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 103 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
184. See id. 
185. See supra note 48.  See also Johnson, supra note 11, at III.A. 
186. (4) Claim of Right. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for theft that 
the actor: 
 (a) was unaware that the property or service was that of another; or  
(b) acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service 
involved or that he had right to acquire or dispose of it as he did;  
(c) took property exposed for sale, intending to purchase and pay for it 
promptly, or reasonably believing that the owner, if present, would 
have consented.  
MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra 
note 25 (January, 2019). 
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belief that the property is his.187  In addition, the defense applies when the 
actor knows that the property is that of another, but believes that he has an 
honest claim to it, or he reasonably believed that the owner would have 
consented, or he thought he had the right to deal with the property in the 
way he did.188  In these cases, he may have the claim-of-right defense, 
which could operate in appropriate cases to preclude a robbery conviction 
under subsections (1), (2) and (3).  For example, if the actor attempts to kill 
or inflicts serious bodily injury under subsection (1), if he believed that he 
had a claim to the property, he would not be guilty of robbery.  He would 
still be guilty of aggravated assault or attempted murder.189  This is 
consistent with the common law view that if the actor would not be guilty 
of theft, he would also not be guilty of robbery.190 
Robbery under subsection (4) does not require a theft, however, but 
rather “obtaining property of another,” so the general claim-of-right defense 
from the theft article is not automatically incorporated into subsection 
(4).191  There is a more limited affirmative defense in subsection (4) that 
operates somewhat like the claim-of-right defense in the other subsections. 
However, the Committee decided that this defense would not apply if the 
actor purposely obtains property of another while threatening to inflict 
bodily injury or commit any other criminal offense under subsection 
(4)(a).192  So the actor would be guilty of robbery, a felony in the fourth 
degree, under subsection (4), even if he thought he might have a claim to 
the property but was purposely obtaining the property of another by 
threatening bodily injury and some other criminal offense.193 
For the first three degrees, the first question, then, is what does “in 
the course of committing a theft” mean?  The Model Code definition, which 
the Committee adopted, adding some clarifying language in this regard, is 
as follows: 
 
An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a theft” under 
sections (1), (2) or (3), if it occurs in an attempt to commit a theft, 
 
187. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 153 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).   
188. See id. at 155. 
189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) requires that to be 
guilty of attempt, the actor must be purposeful regarding the target crime, in this case 
murder under MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  Aggravated assault 
under MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985), however, may be 
committed if the actor is reckless.  
190. See LAFAVE supra note 48, at 1046-47. 
191. See infra note 249 and discussion accompanying notes 249-59. 
192. The defense would usually not apply to another subsection, (4)(g), either, 
but it is not precluded.  See infra note 256 and discussion accompanying notes 287-290.  
193. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
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as defined under Section 223.1, or in flight after the attempt or 
commission.194  
 
“In the course of” thus covers the attempted theft, the accomplished theft 
and the flight from a theft or attempted theft.195  If the threatening behavior 
occurs during this time frame, it should be punished as robbery.  One who 
uses force in order to escape from his crime is the kind of actor who would 
have used force to accomplish the theft and is considered just as 
dangerous.196  There is no time limit on how long the flight lasts; however, 
such considerations are appropriate for judicial interpretation, perhaps with 
reference to the law regarding “fresh pursuit.”197  
There is no requirement that the theft be “from the person or in the 
presence of the victim.”198  In these days of electronic communication, the 
victim could be compelled to disgorge funds electronically to avoid being 
shot, for example.  In addition, there is no requirement that the victim of 
the theft be the one threatened or attacked.199  Under all of the robbery 
offenses, the threat or attempt does not have to be against the victim of the 
theft, but to “another,” meaning other than the actor.200  However, 
subsection (2)(b), threatening to inflict serious bodily injury, requires an 
immediate threat, as opposed to extortion under subsection (4), which does 
not require that the threat to be immediate.201  The distinction between the 
threats under subsection (4) and subsection (2) is that under subsection (2), 
the threat could be carried out immediately and/or the threatened harm is 
more serious.202  The two factors, immediacy and seriousness of threat, 
justify the difference in penalty,203 as discussed further below.204 The 
 
194. MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  The original version of the Model Code did not reference 
the theft article, MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985), so the Committee 
thought that should be clarified.  Also, as discussed below, when we added extortion to 
robbery, we needed to clarify that “in the course of” applied to sections (1)-(3). Id. 
195. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
196. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 112 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  
197. See id. at 104. 
198. See id. at 112. 
199. See id. at 110. 
200. See id.  
201. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(2(b) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(4)(a) as 
adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020).  
202. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 110-11 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
203. See id. 
204. See infra note 236 discussion accompanying notes 235-39. 
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threatening behavior implies purposefulness, although this is not 
expressed.205 
The seriousness of the threat or force is the second important 
element and distinguishes the various grades of robbery.  The Model Code 
drafters were concerned that robbery should be distinguished from ordinary 
theft from the person, which is addressed under the theft article.206  In order 
to accomplish this, the drafters recognized only two forms of robbery, both 
of which required threats of death or serious bodily injury or a threat of a 
felony in the first or second degree.207  Most states thought that this was too 
restrictive,208 and the Committee agreed, adding two more forms of robbery 
to the statute.209  
Under the statute as re-drafted by the Committee, the most serious 
form of robbery occurs while in the course of committing a theft, the actor 
attempts to kill another or “purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious 
bodily injury.”210  The drafters considered this to be such a serious offense 
that it was classified as a felony in the first degree, and the Committee 
agreed.211  The Committee, however, as with the other subsections, 
addressed the penalty for the offense in each subsection, while the Model 
Code addressed the issue in a separate subsection on grading.212 
Subsection (1) requires that the actor be purposeful throughout in 
attempting to kill or inflicting or attempting serious bodily injury.213  
Requiring purposefulness identifies the most dangerous offenders and 
justifies the more serious penalty.214  If the harm actually occurs, then that 
offense would also be punished.   
The second most serious form of robbery is punished under 
subsection (2) as a second degree felony.215  Robbery under subsections 
 
205. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
206. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 222 cmt. at 103 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
207. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
208. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 106 (AM. LAW INST. 1980) 
209. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE §222.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 
2020; August 2020). 
210. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
211. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE §222.1(1) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 
2020). 
212. Id.  
213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(1) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
214. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
215. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with 
MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(2) (a) & (b) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra 
note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
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(2)(a) and (b) occurs when, while in the course of committing a theft, the 
actor recklessly inflicts—or threatens or purposely puts another in fear of—
immediate serious bodily injury.216  In addition, there is a final possibility 
for robbery under the original version of the Model Code, which was 
adopted by the Committee, and that is, if the in the course of the theft, the 
actor commits or threatens immediately to commit a felony in the first or 
second degree.217 This type of robbery is also classified as a felony in the 
second degree under subsection (2)(c).218   
Besides arrangement of the statute, the only other difference 
between the Model Code version of robbery as a second degree offense and 
the Committee’s version is the express addition of the mens rea of 
recklessness for inflicting serious bodily injury.219  The Model Code did not 
add the term “reckless,” but relied on the operation of section 2.02 to supply 
it.220  Whenever possible, the Committee expressed mens rea in each 
particular statute, rather than relying on section 2.02 to supply the mens rea 
of at least recklessness when mens rea is not expressed.221  The Committee 
thought that so much reliance on section 2.02 was a mistake on the part of 
the drafters.222  
The remainder of the statute is different from the original version of 
the Model Code.  The Committee decided that there were gaps in the 
robbery statute proposed by the drafters, so subsections (3) and (4) were 
added to cover other conduct that should be punished as robbery.223   
Under subsection (3)(a), robbery is a felony in the third degree, if in 
the course of committing theft or attempted theft, the actor recklessly 
inflicts any bodily injury upon another, as opposed to serious bodily injury 
 
216. MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(2) (a) & (b) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
217. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
218. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(1)(c) & (2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) 
with MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(2)(c) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra 
note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
219. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(2)(a) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 
(July 10, 2020). 
220. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 118 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (September 2006).  See Johnson, supra note 1, at 120 for more explanation 
of section 2.02. 
222. Id. 
223. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) with MODEL 
PENAL CODE §222.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 
2020; August 14, 2020). 
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required under subsection (2).224  Bodily injury as defined under the Model 
Code and adopted by the Committee is not merely offensive touching, as 
defined by the common law,225 but requires “physical pain, illness, or any 
impairment of physical condition.”226  The Committee decided that 
recklessly inflicting bodily injury was deserving of a third degree felony 
punishment because of the special circumstance of robbery that causes 
widespread fear among the populace because of the element of violence 
added to the theft or attempted theft.227  
Similarly, the Committee also considered that threatening to inflict 
serious bodily injury to accomplish the theft was sufficiently serious, even 
if the threat to do so is not immediate, as required under subsection (2).228  
Subsection (3)(b) adds such a threat as a third degree felony.229  While 
subsection (2) proscribes theft or attempted theft while committing or 
threatening felonies in the first or second degree,230 the Committee thought 
that committing or threatening to immediately commit any other felony 
would be sufficient for robbery as a third degree felony, as proscribed in 
subsection (3).231  
Finally, the Committee added “taking property from another by 
force” as subsection 3(d).232  A purse-snatching would otherwise be 
punished as theft, and—depending on the value of property—the offense 
could be punished as just a misdemeanor.233  But because such a crime 
causes the same fright and possible to danger to persons, the Committee 
decided to add such conduct to the third degree version of robbery.234   
 We also decided to move extortion from the theft article235 to 
subsection (4) of robbery236 because the conduct required of both crimes 
 
224. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(3)(a) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(2)(a) as 
adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
225. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
226. See supra note 165 and accompanying discussion. 
227. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 98 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
228. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(3)(b) (as adopted by the 
Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 
222.1(2)(b) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
229. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(3)(b) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
230. Id. at § 222.1(2)(c).  
231. Id. at § 222.1(3)(c). 
232. Id. at § 222.1(3)(d). 
233 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  Minutes, supra note 
25 (January, February, August 14, 2020). 
234. Id. at § 222.1(3)(d). 
235. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
236. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.4 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
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involves threats and intimidation.237  The essence of the crime is not really 
the amount of property, which determines the punishment under theft, but 
the distress to the person caused by threatening him.  Along with other 
states, the Committee believed that this conduct should be punished as 
robbery, not theft, which is a purely property crime.238  The most obvious 
difference between extortion and robbery, as commonly understood, is that 
robbery requires an immediate threat, while extortion does not require the 
threat to be immediate.  In addition, the threats that constitute robbery are 
usually more serious than the threats that constitute extortion.239    
Thus, a person is guilty of robbery under subsection (4), which is a 
felony in the fourth degree, if he purposely obtains the property of another 
by certain listed threats.240  The Committee incorporated the definitions 
from the article that covers theft, article 223, into article 222.241  The Model 
Code defines property as basically “anything of value.”242  In addition, the 
Model Code defines “property of another” to include property in which any 
person other that the actor has an interest that the actor is not privileged to 
infringe.243  “Obtain” means “to bring about a transfer or purported transfer 
of a legal interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another.”244 
 
237. See infra note 240 and discussion accompanying notes 240-94.  
238. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (January, February, July 10, 2020). 
239. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(1-3) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1985). 
240. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.4 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
241. Id. at § 222.0. 
242. (7) “Property” means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and 
intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other interests in or 
claims to wealth, credit and debit cards, credit extended by any license gaming 
establishment, admission or transportation tickets, captured or domestic animals, food 
and drink, or electric or other power. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(7) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra 
note 25 (January, 2019). 
243. (8) “Property of another” includes property in which any person other that 
the actor has an interest which the actor is not privileged to infringe, regardless of the 
fact that the actor has an interest in the property and regardless of the fact that the other 
person might be precluded from civil recovery because the property was used in an 
unlawful transaction or was subject to forfeiture as contraband. Property in possession of 
the actor shall not be deemed property of another who has only a security interest therein, 
even if legal title is in the creditor pursuant to a conditional sales contract other security 
agreement.  
Id. at § 223.0(8).  See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 166-74 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1980) for a complete explanation of these definitions. I plan to cover theft in the 
next article. 
244. (6) “Obtain: means: 
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The threat does not have to be explicit, and it may be written or 
oral.245  In addition, as with the other subsections of robbery, the person 
who is the object of the threatened harm does not have to be the victim of 
the threat or attempted threat.246  There is no requirement that the person 
from whom the property is extorted be related in any way to the object of 
the threatened harm.247  The jury may decide whether the threat to injure an 
unrelated third person is sufficient to prove the actor’s purpose.248  
Because robbery under subsection (4) was originally conceived of 
as a property crime under the theft article, there was a claim-of-right 
defense that applied to this subsection when it was part of theft.249  As 
discussed above, theft requires that the actor be purposeful in obtaining 
property of another.250  If he has a claim that he honestly believes that he is 
entitled to the property, he should not be guilty of theft, and therefore not 
guilty of robbery.  The claim-of-right defense also applies in other 
situations.251  However, as opposed to the other subsections of robbery, 
subsection (4) does not require proof of theft, but only obtaining property 
of another by threats.  Therefore, the claim-of-right defense under section 
223.1 does not apply to this subsection.252  As with robbery under the other 
subsections, if the actor believes that the property is his and not that of 
another, he is also not guilty of robbery under subsection (4) because he 
lacks the necessary intent to commit the offense.253  However, as discussed 
earlier,254 a specific affirmative defense, similar to a claim-of-right defense, 
is nevertheless necessary for this subsection, but is not applicable in all 
cases.255   
The affirmative defense may be available under subsection (4), if 
the property obtained was honestly claimed as restitution or 
 
(a) in relation to property, to bring about a transfer or purported transfer of a 
legal interest in the property, whether to the obtainer or another, or 
(b)  in relation to labor or service, to secure performance thereof.  
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(6) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  Minutes, supra note 25 
(January, 2019). 
245. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 205-06 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
246. See id. at 206-07. 
247. See id. 
248. See id.  
249. MODEL PENAL CODE §223.1(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (January 2019; July 10, 2020). 
250. See supra note 242 and discussion accompanying notes 236-39. 
251. See supra note 249 and discussion accompanying notes 186-90. 
252. See id. 
253. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020; August 14, 2020). 
254. See supra note 186 and discussion accompanying notes 191-93. 
255. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 204-05 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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indemnification for the harm that relates to the threat or “as compensation 
for property or lawful service.”256  The Committee decided that threats to 
inflict bodily injury or to commit another crime under subsection (4)(a) 
should not be subject to the affirmative defense.  These threats are 
considered more important to punish than the property crime involved.257 
In addition, the affirmative defense would not usually apply to subsection 
(4)(g), which requires the actor to threaten any other harm that does not 
benefit him; however, the defense is not precluded for subsection (4)(g).  
Otherwise, the affirmative defense is applicable under subsection (4) if the 
threat was to obtain property honestly claimed as restitution or 
indemnification for harm done or as lawful compensation.258  It should be 
noted that the Committee added to the affirmative defense that the actor 
“then claimed and honestly believed” to clarify that this claim must be made 
at the time of the threat and not as an after-the-fact justification.259 
The listed threats begin in subsection (4)(a) with threatening “to 
inflict bodily injury upon anyone or commit any other criminal offense.”260  
The threat in subsection 4(a) does not have to immediate.261  However, if 
the threat was immediate and of serious bodily injury, this would be a 
second degree felony under subsection (2).262  When the threat was not 
immediate, but the threat was of serious bodily injury, it would be 
punishable under subsection (3), as a third degree felony.263  A threat to 
commit bodily injury of any kind would be a fourth degree felony under 
section (4)(a).264  
 As discussed above, the general claim-of-right defense under the 
theft article, article 223.1,265 does not apply to subsection (4), since this 
subsection is no longer a part of theft.  In addition, the specific affirmative 
 
256. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
257. Id.  
258. Id.  
259. Id.  
260. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(a) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
261. Id. 
262. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(2)(b) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(a) as 
adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
263. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(3)(b) as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). with MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(a) as 
adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
264. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(a) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (January 2019; August 14, 2020). 
265. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (February 8, 2019). 
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defense that applies to this subsection does not cover subsection (4)(a).266  
Therefore, there is no defense in the statute that applies to subsection (4)(a).  
As discussed earlier,267 although the actor may not be guilty of robbery 
under subsections (1), (2), and (3) because he believes he has a claim to the 
property, he may be guilty under subsection (4)(a), as long as he is 
purposely obtaining the property of another.268 
The second listed threat under subsection (4)(b) is to accuse anyone 
of a criminal offense.269  As noted earlier,270 the affirmative defense 
specifically covers the situation in which the “property was honestly 
claimed as restitution or indemnification for the harm done” or as lawful 
compensation.271 However, it is irrelevant whether the threat is true or 
false.272  Therefore, in a negotiation for relief in a civil action, if the remedy 
were honestly claimed, it would not be robbery under this subsection to 
threaten a criminal charge.273 
The third listed threat in subsection (4)(c) is to expose “any secret 
tending to subject the person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair 
his credit or business repute.”274  The affirmative defense applies to this 
paragraph because threatening to expose such a secret could be considered 
a legitimate negotiating technique to get restitution or indemnification, for 
example.275   
The fourth listed threat in subsection (4)(d) is to “take or withhold 
action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.”276  This 
could also be bribery under section 240.1,277 if all of the elements are 
met.278  Bribery requires pecuniary benefit or any benefit in exchange for 
 
266. Id.  Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
267. See supra discussion accompanying notes 191-93. 
268. See supra note 256.  
269. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(b) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (January 2019; August 14, 2020). 
270. See supra note 256 and discussion accompanying notes 256-59. 
271. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
272. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 212 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
273. See id. at 213. 
274. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(c) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
275. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 215 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
276. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(4)(d) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
277. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 217 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
278. Section 240.1 Bribery in Official and Political Matter    
A person is guilty of bribery, a felony of the third degree, if he offers, confers, 
or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from 
another:  
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official action, as opposed to robbery, which requires attempting to obtain 
or obtaining anything of value.279  Robbery requires a threat, while bribery 
does not.280  The affirmative defense applies to subsection (4)d), so that 
official action may be threatened if the actor has an honest belief that he is 
entitled to compensation, restitution or indemnification.281  
The fifth listed threat in subsection (4)(e) covers threatening 
collective action that is not for the benefit of the group represented.282  This 
paragraph covers the situation in which the union leader was threatening a 
strike if the employer does not pay him an amount of money.283  The 
affirmative defense applies to subsection (4)e); however, if the threat of 
collective action was for the benefit of the group, the actor would not be 
guilty under this paragraph in any event.284 
Subsection (4)(f), the sixth listed threat, applies to threats to testify 
or provide information or withhold testimony or information regarding the 
legal claim or defense of another.285  The affirmative defense would apply 
here if the actor honestly claimed that he was entitled to restitution or 
indemnification for the harm done or as lawful compensation.  However, 
this conduct could also be bribery of a witness or intimidation of a witness, 
if all the elements of that crime were met.286  
 
(1) any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, opinion, 
recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion as a public servant or party 
official; or voter or 
(2) any benefit as consideration for the recipient's decision, vote, 
recommendation or other exercise of official discretion in a judicial or 
administrative proceeding; or 
(3) any benefit as consideration for a violation of a known legal duty as public 
servant or party election official.  
It is no defense to prosecution under this section that a the person 
whom the actor sought to be influenced was not qualified to act in the desired 
way, whether because he had not yet assumed office, or lacked jurisdiction, or 
for any other reason. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra 
note 25 (February, 2020). 
279. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (February 14, 2020) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 (as 
adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (February 14, 2020). 
280. Id.  
281. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 217 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
282. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(e) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
283. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 218 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
284. See id. 
285. MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(4)(f) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
286. The Committee adopted the following version of intimidation or bribery of 
witnesses, which was based on the current Mississippi Code statutes: 
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The seventh and last threat in subsection (4)(g) is a catchall.  The 
original version of the Model Code expressed this part as a threat to “inflict 
any other harm that would not benefit the actor.”287  The Committee decided 
that this was confusing and needed some limiting and explanatory 
language, which we borrowed the Alabama code.288  Paragraph (g) now 
covers harm that would not substantially benefit the actor but that is 
calculated to substantially harm another person “with respect to his health, 
safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal 
relationships.”289  The Model Code comments provide some examples, 
such as a law professor who extorts money from his students by threatening 
to give them bad grades.290  Although not precluded, the affirmative defense 
usually does not apply to this paragraph because the harm, a bad grade, 
would not benefit the actor, and he has no claim to the money he is extorting 
from the students, which is necessary to claim the defense.  
As noted earlier, subsection (4) is related to theft but does not use 
the term.291  Also, robbery under subsection (4) is closely related to criminal 
coercion covered by section 212.5292  The purpose of the threats under 
 
Section 241.xx Intimidation or Bribery of a Witness 
A person commits a felony in the third degree if he attempts by force, 
deception, offer of any pecuniary benefit or threat or other form of intimidation 
to induce a witness or a person he believes will be called as a witness in any 
official proceeding to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; or 
(b) unlawfully withhold any testimony, information, document or 
thing; or 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to testify or supply evidence; 
or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he 
has been legally summoned. 
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 241xx Minutes, supra note 25 (July 12, 2019) 
287. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(7) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
288. ALA. CODE § 13A-8-1(14)(k) (West, Westlaw through 2021, No. 21-76). 
289. MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(4) (g) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
290. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 223 cmt. at 223 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
291. See supra note 256 and discussion accompanying notes 186-93. 
292. Section 212.5 Criminal Coercion 
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose 
unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage or refrain from 
engaging in conduct to his detriment, he recklessly threatens, explicitly or 
implicitly, to: 
 (a) commit any criminal offense; or 
 (b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or 
 (c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt  
or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute; or 
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or 
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criminal coercion is to limit the victim’s freedom of action, as opposed to 
subsection (4), the purpose of which is to obtain property.293  The list of 
threats under criminal coercion is not as comprehensive as the list under 
subsection (4) because the purpose is more clearly defined under the 
latter.294 
The next crime, burglary, is the final crime that combines the idea 
of danger to persons and, somewhat incorrectly, danger to property.  Of the 
three crimes addressed in this article, burglary has veered further from its 
original purpose of protecting people in their homes.295 We will discuss 




withhold action. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on 
paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) that the actor reasonably believed the 
accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified 
and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a 
way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of 
the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting 
from further misbehavior, making …good a wrong done, refraining 
from taking any action or responsibility for which the actor believes 
the other disqualified. 
(2) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that:  
(a) the actor reasonably believed the accusation or secret to be true or 
the proposed action justified, and 
(b)(i) that the primary purpose of the threat was to cause the other to 
conduct himself in his own best interest; or 
(b)(ii) that a purpose of the threat was to cause the other to desist from 
immoral or unreasonable conduct, engage in behavior from which he 
could not lawfully abstain, make good a wrong done by him, or refrain 
from taking any action or responsibility for which he was disqualified. 
(2)  
(3) Grading.  
(a) Criminal Coercion is a felony in the third degree if the threat is to 
commit a felony in the first or second degree or the actor’s purpose is 
felonious in the first or second degree. 
(b) Criminal Coercion is a felony in the fourth degree if the threat is to 
commit a felony in the third degree or the actor’s purpose is to commit 
a felony in the third degree. 
(c)  Otherwise, Criminal Coercion is a Class A Misdemeanor. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra 
note 25 (June 8, 2018).  See Johnson supra note 11, at IV.E for a complete discussion of 
criminal coercion. 
293. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (June 8, 2018) with MODEL PENAL CODE §222.1(4) as adopted by 
the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 (August 14, 2020). 
294. See Johnson supra note 11, at IV.E. 
295. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1079-80. 
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V. BURGLARY AND OTHER RELATED OFFENSES. 
 
Article 221 of the Model Code addresses burglary and another less 
serious criminal intrusion, criminal trespass.296  The Committee added 





Under the common law, burglary was considered an inherently 
dangerous crime because “breaking and entering the dwelling of another in 
the night time with the intent to commit a felony”298 threatened the safety 
of the occupants.299  It was classified as a crime against habitation (where 
people lived) and occupation,300 when people were likely to be there.301  
Felonies were few at common law, and any person who was intending to 
commit a felony was considered to be a dangerous character.302  Statutory 
changes to burglary became common in more recent times, so that burglary 
was no longer a threat to habitation but more of a property crime.303  
Burglary could be committed by entering any structure, even a salvation 
army box,304 thus it was no longer a crime against habitation.305  In addition, 
under most statutes burglary could be committed in the daytime, when it 
was not as likely that anyone would be home, so the crime lost its 
justification as an implied threat to persons.306  Furthermore, many statutes 
required only that the defendant be in the commission of any crime, thus 
losing the seriousness implied by the felony requirement.307  The Model 
Code provision was designed to hew more to the original purpose of 
 
296. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
297. See infra Section V. C. 
298. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 192. 
299. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 61,67 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
300. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 192. 
301. See, e.g., People v. Gauze, 542 P. 2d 1365, 1366 (Cal. 1975).  
302. The punishment for a felony was hanging.  BLACKSTONE, WILLIAM, AND 
WILLIAM CAREY JONES. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. Vol. 2, Bancroft-
Whitney, 1915-1916. The Making of Modern Law: Legal Treatises, 1800–1926, 
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/F0152900037/MOML?u=jack98403&sid=MOML&xid=1
95be867. Accessed 20 Aug. 2020. Also, “[n]o crime was considered a felony which did 
not occasion a total forfeiture of the offender’s lands or good or both.” Kurtz v. Moffitt, 
115 U.S. 487, 499 (1885). 
303. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1069-70. 
304. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 628 P.2d 361 (Ariz. 1981). 
305. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1077. 
306, See id. 
307. See id. at 1078-79. 
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burglary and that is to punish the threat to habitation and persons more 
commensurately, as opposed to other less serious forms of criminal 
intrusions.308  
The Model Code drafters had considered whether to eliminate 
burglary as a separate offense.309  Since burglary was punished separately 
from the felony intended, it was a type of attempt crime.310  The drafters 
opined that the reason that a separate burglary crime was necessary was 
because of the inadequacies in the law of attempt, as discussed earlier.311  
Attempt was punished as a misdemeanor at common law, and the defendant 
had to be close to success to constitute attempt.312  These requirements were 
ameliorated by the Model Code’s punishing attempt as seriously as the 
crime intended in most cases and requiring only a substantial step, not a 
near-miss.313  
The drafters ultimately decided that burglary, properly defined, 
should be criminally punished because the unexplained intrusion to commit 
a crime is often more of a threat than the crime intended.314  Also, the 
prosecution has more latitude in proving the defendant’s criminal purpose 
under a burglary statute, which could have a number of criminal purposes, 
as opposed to attempt, which requires proof that the purpose was to commit 
a specific target crime.315  In addition, burglary is deeply embedded in the 
Anglo-American tradition of keeping people safe in their homes.316 
The Committee adopted the Model Code’s version of burglary with 
a few changes as indicated by the underlined and stricken portions as 
follows:317 
 
Section 221.1 Burglary  
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or surreptitiously 
remains in a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or 
occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein, 
unless the premises are at that time open to the public or the actor is 
licensed or privileged to enter or remain. It is an affirmative defense 
 
308. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 67 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
309. See id.at 66. 
310. See id. at 63. 
311. See id. at 62-63; supra note 48. 
312. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 63 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
313. See Johnson, supra note 11, at III.A. 
314. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 211 cmt. at 67 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
315. See id. at 68 
316. See id. at 67 
317. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee (July 10, 
2020).  Minutes, supra note 25 (July 14, 2020). 
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to prosecution for burglary that the building or structure was 
abandoned.  
(2) Burglary is a felony of the second degree if it is perpetrated in 
the dwelling of another at night, of if, in the course of committing 
the offense, the actor: 
(a) purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to 
inflict bodily injury on anyone; or 
(b) is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon. 
Otherwise, burglary is a felony in the third degree. An act shall 
be deemed “in the course of committing” an offense if it occurs 
in an attempt to commit the offense or in flight after the attempt 
or commission.  
(3). A person may not be convicted both for burglary and for the 
offense that which it was his purpose to commit after the burglarious 
entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the additional 
offense constitutes a felony of the first or second degree.  
 
 Burglary, as proposed by the Committee, is entering or remaining 
surreptitiously in a building absent permission.318  If the burglary is into a 
dwelling, the offense is a felony in the second degree.319  In other words, as 
adopted by Committee,320 if the threat is to a habitation, burglary is a crime 
of the same seriousness as manslaughter.321  The Model Code added other 
enhancements that elevate the crime to a second degree felony: 1) 
purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily 
injury on anyone; or 2) being armed with explosives or a dangerous 
weapon.322  
 The comments to the Model Code discussed four issues that 
determine the seriousness of the offense: the nature of the entry, the place 
of the entry, the actor’s purpose in entering, and factors that aggravate the 
offense.323  The Committee agreed with the comments’ analysis, except 
where indicated otherwise.  
 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at § 221.1(2). 
320. The original version of the MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1985) required a nighttime entry, which the Committee eliminated.  MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee (July 10, 2020), as discussed infra 
discussion accompanying notes 360-67.  
321. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee (July 10, 
2020).  See discussion accompanying notes 299-308 and Johnson supra note 1, at 137. 
322. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).   
323. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art 221.1 cmt. at 68 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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 First, the nature of the entry must be unprivileged,324 in other 
words, an actor may not be guilty of burglary in entering his own dwelling, 
for example.  This is derived from the common law requirement that the 
entry must be into the dwelling of another.325  However, the requirement 
that the entry must be unprivileged more particularly replaces the common 
law requirement of “breaking,” which was defined as “making a physical 
opening by trespass” (that is, without consent).326  Because breaking is 
often difficult to prove, the requirement was either eliminated by statute327 
or became little more than symbolic.328  Unprivileged entry would include 
situations in which the premises are not open to the public, so that if the 
premises were open to the public, even if a particular person or class of 
persons, such as shoplifters, had been specifically prohibited from entering, 
the crime of burglary is inappropriate.329  The unprivileged entry is thus not 
expanded to include anyone who enters with a bad purpose, as some statutes 
have done.330  The purpose is to limit burglary to surreptitious entries, in 
keeping with the object of the revision, to limit burglary to situations that 
aggravate the crime intended.331  Punishing a shoplifter for burglary is 
significantly removed from the original purpose of keeping people safe in 
their homes. The Committee chose to punish this conduct as criminal 
trespass in the next subsection, discussed below.332  
 In addition to the requirement of unprivileged entry, the 
Committee added “remaining surreptitiously in the structure.”333  
Therefore, if the actor intends to commit a crime, he may be guilty of 
burglary if he remains surreptitiously, unless he is privileged to remain or 
the business is open to the public at the time.334  Thus, if a customer hides 
and remains in the store after it is closed to the public to steal merchandise, 
he could be guilty of burglary.  This obviates the prosecutorial difficulty in 
proving the actor’s original intent when he entered, if he remains secreted 
on the premises after it is closed to the public.335  The original version of 
the Model Code punished remaining in a structure as criminal trespass 
 
324. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
325. See discussion accompanying notes 298-301.  
326. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1070-71. 
327. Id. at 1071. 
328. See MODEL PENAL CODE Art 221.1 cmt. at 69 (AM. LAW INST. 1980) 
329. See id. at 68. 
330. See id. at 69. 
331. See id. 
332. See infra text accompanying note 382. 
333. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
334. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE Art 221.1 cmt. at 69 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
335, Cf.id. at 70 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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under section 221.2, discussed below.336  However, the Committee thought 
that this conduct was a logical addition to the burglary statute.337   
 The second issue discussed in the Model Code comments is the 
type of structure involved.  The Model Code burglary provision applies to 
“a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion 
thereof.”338  Again the purpose of burglary was to protect habitations, so 
this requirement is more reminiscent of that purpose than current statutes 
that allow burglary into automobiles and storage boxes.339 
 “Occupied structure” is defined in section 221.0(1) as “any 
structure, vehicle or place adapted for overnight accommodation of 
persons, or for carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is 
actually present.”340  Thus, the place of entry must be into a habitation or a 
business, so that stealing clothes from a Salvation Army box or a purse from 
a passenger car would no longer be burglary.  Both of these crimes lack the 
aggravation required for burglary.  Again the idea is still keeping people 
safe, either in their homes or businesses, even if no one is actually present. 
Intrusions into such places may still involve the same danger and alarm that 
should be proscribed by burglary.341  
 Even if the place of entry is a vehicle, if it is adapted for 
business—such as a food truck—or overnight occupancy—such as a motor 
home—it could be the subject of burglary.342  Also, there is specific 
protection for separately secured or occupied portions of a building so that 
individual units of a building, such as hotel rooms and apartments, are 
 
336, MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
337. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(1) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
338. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); See MODEL PENAL 
CODE Art 221.1 cmt. at 185 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
339. See supra note 304 and discussion accompanying notes 303-07. 
340. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  The Committee 
adopted the following definitions for this article:  
Section 221.0. In this Article, unless a different meaning plainly is required: 
(1) "occupied structure" means any structure, vehicle or place that is adapted for 
overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein, 
whether or not a person is actually present. 
(2) "night" means the period between thirty minutes past sunset and thirty 
minutes before sunrise. 
(3) “lawful” means compliance with any affirmative legal duty, whether it arises 
under the criminal law, civil law, or administrative regulation. 
(4) The definitions in section 210.0 are incorporated in this article where 
applicable. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0 as adopted by the Committee.  See Minutes supra 
note 25 (July 10, 2020).  
341. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 72 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
342. See id. at 72-73. 
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protected.343  However, there is an exclusion at the end of the subsection 
(1) for abandoned premises, making it an affirmative defense if the place 
entered was abandoned.344  The affirmative defense is again in keeping with 
the purpose of preventing danger to people.  The Model Code added 
“building or occupied structure” on the assumption that any building would 
be suitable for occupancy.  If it was not suitable, the affirmative defense 
that it was abandoned is available.345  
 The third issue addressed in the Model Code comments is the state 
of mind required for the crime.  As opposed to the common law requirement 
of intent to commit a felony,346 the Model Code requires a purpose to 
commit a crime therein.347  As noted, at common law, the intent to commit 
a felony was crucial to the dangerousness of burglary.348  Statutory changes 
in many jurisdictions had reduced this requirement to intent to commit any 
crime.349  The drafters believed that the true danger lay in the unprivileged 
entry with intent to commit a crime into a place where people could be 
endangered.350  Therefore, the defendant may be guilty of burglary if he 
intends to commit a felony or a misdemeanor.  Intent to commit a felony 
may be an aggravating factor, however, which will be discussed as the 
fourth issue.351  Intent to commit only a violation is not sufficient to 
constitute burglary under the Model Code.352  
 Since it is often difficult to ascertain the intention of the actor if 
his purpose is not achieved, simply requiring that he intended to commit a 
crime therein relieves the prosecutor of this burden.353  Also by adding the 
word “therein,” the prosecutor must prove more than that the actor 
trespassed because the trespass would have already been accomplished by 
the unprivileged entry.354  If no independent criminal purpose is proven, the 
actor could still be guilty of criminal trespass, discussed in the next 
section.355 
 The fourth issue discussed in the Model Code comments involves 
grading and aggravating factors.  The Model Code classifies burglary as a 
 
343. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
344. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
345. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 72-73 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
346. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1078. 
347. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
348. See supra discussion accompanying note 302. 
349. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1079. 
350. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
351. See infra discussion accompanying notes 356-72.  
352. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
353. See id at 78. 
354. See id. 
355. See infra text accompanying note 382. 
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third degree felony,356 absent aggravating factors.  One of the objectives of 
the drafters was to rehabilitate burglary from the statutory changes that had 
reduced it to little more than a property crime,357 often without a 
proportionate reduction in the punishment.358  Along with the other changes 
discussed above, the Model Code drafters added some aggravating factors 
that would elevate burglary from a third degree felony to a second degree 
felony.359  
 The first aggravating factor harkens back to the original purpose 
of keeping people safe in their homes.  Section 221.1(2) requires that for 
burglary to be second degree felony, it must involve entry into a 
dwelling.360  The original Model Code provision added “at night,” which 
the Committee deleted, believing that the unprivileged entry into a dwelling 
in the daytime is sufficiently dangerous to be an aggravated factor.361  
Common law burglary required that the breaking and entering must be into 
a dwelling at night.362  The crime was designed to protect habitation 
(dwelling), which it did specifically.  The nighttime requirement was to 
protect occupancy (meaning that a person is present)363 because people 
were likely to be home in that era at night, as opposed to the daytime and 
that at night “honest men were more likely to fall prey to criminals.”364  This 
is less likely to be true in the modern era, which the Committee recognized 
by deleting the nighttime requirement.365  While it is true that entry during 
the nighttime may cause more alarm, the Committee viewed the 
requirement as unnecessary.  In addition, even though the Committee 
adopted the Model Code definition of nighttime for other purposes,366 the 
nighttime requirement could still be difficult to prove in some cases and 
had been eliminated by statute in many jurisdictions for this reason.367 
 
356. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
357. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
358. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1079-81. 
359. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
360. Id. at § 221.1(2). 
361. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
362. See supra note 298 and discussion accompanying notes 298-302. 
363. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 192.  The Model Code’s definition of 
“occupied” is more akin to the definition of habitation.  See id and MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 221.0(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
364. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1077. 
365. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
366. Id. The definition of nighttime proposed by the Model Code and adopted 
by the Committee is Section 221.0 (2) “‘night’ means the period between thirty minutes 
past sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(2) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1985) 
367. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1077. 
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 The Model Code recognizes two other aggravating factors: when 
the actor “purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict 
bodily injury on anyone” or “is armed with explosives or a deadly 
weapon.”368  Either of these conditions obviously increases the danger to 
people.  “Bodily injury” and “deadly weapon” are defined in section 
210.0(2),369 which the Committee incorporated into this article.370  Attempt 
is defined in section 5.01.371  Section 221.1(2) defines “in the course of 
committing” the offense as “if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense 
or in flight after the attempt or commission.” 372 
 The last issue in grading concerns how multiple offenses are 
treated.  Burglary is in the nature of an attempt crime usually much more 
serious than the burglarious intent, which is often to steal.373  However, 
because of the seriousness of burglary, it generally did not merge into the 
crime intended, nor did that crime merge into burglary.374  The Model Code 
drafters believed that punishing non-aggravated burglary as a third degree 
offense was sufficient and that if the crime intended was also a third degree 
offense or misdemeanor, both crimes should not be separately charged.  
However, if the crime intended was a first or second degree offense, both 
burglary and the crime intended should be charged.375  Attempt to commit 
the proposed crime is penalized the same as the crime intended.376   
 The Committee agreed with this position, but eliminated some of 
the language.377  
 
(3). A person may not be convicted both for burglary and for the 
offense which it was his purpose to commit after the burglarious 
entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the additional 
offense constitutes a felony of the first or second degree.378  
 
The Committee thought that it was sufficiently clear that the subsection was 
referring to the additional offense that the actor intended to commit without 
 
368. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
369. See supra note 92. 
370. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
371. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  See supra notes 48 
and 311. 
372. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
373. See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at 1079. 
374. Id. at 1080. 
375, See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 83 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  
376. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(3) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020).  
377. Id.  
378. Id.  
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including the phrase “after the burglarious entry.”  The phrase was not only 
unnecessary, but it might also introduce the possibly confusing and 
undefined term of “burglarious entry,” well known at common law but not 
otherwise referenced in this statute.379 
 As noted above, when the prosecution is unable to prove that the 
unprivileged entry was with the purpose of committing an independent 
crime, the defendant may be charged with criminal trespass.380  We will 
discuss that offense next. 
 
B. Criminal Trespass 
 
 Criminal trespass under Section 221.2 is a lesser included offense 
to burglary and is a misdemeanor because it does not include the element 
of intent to commit a crime.381  The Committee adopted the following 
version of criminal trespass with several changes to the Model Code 
version.  These changes are indicated by underlining for added words and 
stricken words for deletions. 
 
Section 221.2 Criminal Trespass  
(1)  A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed 
and privileged to do so, he enters or surreptitiously remains in any 
building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied 
portion thereof, or enters or remains on any land for the purpose of 
hunting. An offense under this Subsection is a Class A misdemeanor 
if it is committed in a dwelling at night. Otherwise it is a Class D 
misdemeanor. petty misdemeanor. 
(2) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed 
or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which 
notice against trespass is given by: 
 (a) actual communication to the actor; or 
 (b) posting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably 
 likely to come to the attention of intruders; or 
(c) fencing or other enclosure manifestly designed to 
exclude intruders. 
An offense under this Subsection constitutes a petty Class D 
misdemeanor if the offender defies an order to leave personally 
communicated to him by the owner of the premises or other 
authorized person. Otherwise it is a violation. 
 
379. See PERKINS, supra note 13, at 209-212. 
380. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note at 26 (July 10, 2020). 
381. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 92 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this Section 
that: 
(a) a building or occupied structure involved in an offense 
under Subsection (1) was abandoned; or  
(b) (a) The premises were at the time open to members of 
the public, and the actor complied with all lawful conditions 
imposed on access to or remaining in the premises; or 
(c) (b) The actor reasonably believed that the owner of the 
premises, or other person empowered to license access 
thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain. 
(4) In this section, a person is not “licensed or privileged,” including 
but not limited to, if he enters or remains in any place, including the 
premises of any public housing authority, after having been 
forbidden to do so, either orally, in writing, or by a sign posted at a 
place in which it may reasonably be seen, by an owner, lessee, 
custodian, or other authorized person, or by the administrators of 
public housing authority, whether or not the person was invited by 
a tenant.382 
   
 The Model Code did not seek to criminalize less serious forms of 
trespass, such as entering unposted woodlands or open land, and the 
Committee agreed.383  Such trespasses should be remedied in civil courts, 
if at all.384  However, when the actor trespasses into a structure or enclosed 
area or onto posted land, if he knows he has no license or privilege to do 
so, this should be treated more seriously.385 
 There are two forms of criminal trespass punished under the 
Section 221.2.  The first, treated in subsection (1), encompasses the same 
type of unprivileged entry or surreptitiously remaining in a building or 
occupied structure386 or portion thereof as the Committee required of 
burglary.387  If the person remains openly after his privilege has expired, he 
may be guilty of trespass under subsection (2), a less serious offense.  There 
is not the same danger of alarm to persons as that posed by one hiding on 
 
382. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
383. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
384, See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
385, See id. at 87. 
386. “Occupied structure” is defined as “any structure, vehicle or place adapted 
for overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein, whether or 
not a person is actually present.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
387. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
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the premises.388  The Committee also added to criminal trespass under 
subsection (1) “entry into or remaining on land for the purpose of 
hunting.”389  
 This first type of criminal trespass in subsection 221.2(1) is 
punished as a Class D misdemeanor, unless it is into a dwelling at night,390 
in which case the offense is a Class A misdemeanor. Because this type of 
trespass could present the same alarm or danger to persons as burglary, even 
if the actor had no other criminal purpose, a Class A misdemeanor 
punishment was considered appropriate.  If the trespass is not into a 
dwelling at night but into any other building or occupied structure at any 
time, the possibility of alarm to persons remains, so the trespass should still 
be assigned misdemeanor punishment.  In that case, as well as in the case 
of entry to hunt, Class D misdemeanor punishment is justified.391  Even 
though there is still the danger of alarm to persons that burglary addresses, 
the fact that the actor is not intending a crime should lessen his 
culpability.392 
 Criminal trespass under subsection (1) requires that the actor 
know that he is not privileged or licensed to enter or remain in any building 
or occupied structure or on land for the purpose of hunting.393  The 
requirement of knowledge is defined under the Model Code, so that the 
actor must be consciously aware that he is not allowed to be where he is.394  
 Criminal trespass under this section does not apply to inadvertent 
trespassers and requires that the actor act with knowledge that he is not 
privileged or licensed to enter or remain on the premises or land.395  The 
Committee added subsection (4) to clarify that the permission of a tenant in 
a public housing authority or other such building does not override notice 
given by the housing authority or other such owner or authorized person.396  
Subsection (4) also specifies that notice may be given either orally or in 
 
388. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 92 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
389. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
390. “Night” is defined as “the period between thirty minutes past sunset and 
thirty minutes before sunrise.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
391. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 92 (AM. LAW INST. 1980); 
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
392. Id.  
393. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(1) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
394. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  See 
supra note 110. 
395. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 88, 93-94 (AM. LAW INST. 
1980) 
396. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(4) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
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writing or by posting a sign that entry is forbidden by an individual or a 
class of persons.397  This subsection was not intended to limit knowledge to 
actual notice.398  Subsection (1) requires proof that the actor have 
knowledge that he was not allowed to be where he is, however that 
knowledge was obtained.399  With regard to subsection (1), knowledge 
could be actual or inferred from general custom, for example, that a person 
entering the house of another may only be privileged to do so under certain 
circumstances.  
 Criminal trespass under subsection (2) involves entry or 
remaining in any place without privilege or license, which may include 
open land.400  If such land is entered with the purpose of hunting, this would 
violate subsection (1);401 otherwise such entry could be criminal trespass 
under subsection (2).  Subsection (2) requires that the actor know he is not 
licensed or privileged to enter.402  This could be in defiance of a no-
trespassing notice of some kind, either a posted or other written notice403 or 
an oral communication by an authorized person.404  The subsection also 
leaves open the possibility that the actor knew that he was not privileged if 
he entered an enclosure manifestly designed to exclude intruders.405  
Trespass under subsection (2) is punished as a violation, unless the actor is 
a “defiant trespasser,” one who has received a personal order to leave, in 
which case the offense is a Class D misdemeanor.406  
 There are three affirmative defenses in the Model Code to 
criminal trespass.407  The first is that the building or occupied structure is 
abandoned.408 However, the Committee did not adopt this affirmative 
defense.  If the actor knows he is not privileged or licensed to enter, the 
Committee thought that it is irrelevant that the structure is abandoned.409 
This idea is especially important when dealing with people trespassing to 




399. Id. at § 221.2(1).   
400. Id. at § 221.2(2). 
401. Id. at § 221.2(1). 
402. Id. at § 221.2(2). 
403. Id. at § 221.2(2)(b). 
404. Id. at § 221.2(2)(a). 
405. Id. at § 221.2(2)(c). 
406. Id. at § 221.2(2).  
407. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
408. Id. at § 221.2(3)(a). 
409. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3), as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
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is abandoned, the trespassing hunter should not be able raise abandonment 
of the structure as a defense.410 
 The second affirmative defense in the Model Code is that the 
premises are open to the public, and the actor complied with all lawful 
conditions.411  The Committee adopted this defense and the following 
definition of “lawful” for this article:  
 
“lawful” means compliance with any affirmative legal duty, 
whether it arises under the criminal law, civil law, or administrative 
regulation.412   
 
Therefore, if the premises are open to the public generally but certain people 
or classes of people are barred by the owner, the question is whether the 
restriction is lawful.  It would be a violation of federal and possibly state 
law to prohibit persons from entering based on their race, for example.413  
 The third affirmative defense in the Model Code is that the actor 
reasonably believed that the owner or other authorized person would have 
licensed him to enter or remain on the premises.414  “Reasonable belief,” as 
adopted by the Committee, means that the actor was not criminally 
negligent in his belief.415  In other words, to be guilty, the prosecutor must 
prove that a reasonable person would not have believed that he would have 
been given permission because there was a substantial risk that if he had 
asked for permission to enter, it would not have been granted. 
 
C. Other statutes adapted from the Mississippi Code 
 
 The Committee is also proposing to retain current Mississippi 
statutes with enhanced penalties for certain trespasses that are considered 
more serious.  The section designated by the Committee as Section 221.3 
provides for fourth degree felony punishment in subsection (1) for trespass 
into premises where atomic machinery, rockets and other dangerous 
 
410. Id. 
411. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3)(a), as adopted by the Committee.  
Minutes, supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
412. Id. at § 221.0(3), as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 25 
(July 10, 2020). 
413. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 221.1 cmt. at 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
414. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(3)(b) as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, 
supra note 25 (July 10, 2020). 
415. § 1.13 General Definitions . . . . 
(16) “reasonably believes” or “reasonable belief” designates a belief that the 
actor is not reckless or criminally negligent in holding. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes, supra note 
25 (December 2006). 
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devices are manufactured or operated with the purpose of committing any 
crime.416  In subsection (2), the same penalty will be levied for simply 
entering a restricted area of such premises.417  Both subsections require that 
the actor know that he is not privileged or licensed to enter.418  
The Committee also retained and updated the statute prohibiting 
entry into the operations area of an airport, assigning this a Class A 
 
416. Section 221.3 Trespass; entry on premises where atomic machinery, 
rockets and other dangerous devices are manufactured or operated., etc. 
A person commits a felony in the fourth degree if, knowing that he is not 
licensed or privileged to do so, he knowingly: 
(1) enters or trespass within the premises of any person, firm or corporation 
manufacturing or constructing or erecting or assembling or maintaining or repairing or 
operating any nuclear powered machinery, equipment or vessels, or rockets, missiles, 
propulsion systems, explosives or other dangerous devices, or parts thereof, with the 
intent purpose of committing to commit any crime under the laws of this state, or of the 
United States, or pursuant to a conspiracy to commit any such crime or in an attempt to 
commit any such crime. Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall be 
adjudged guilty of a felony, and punished by a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($ 
5,000.00) or by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not to exceed five (5) years, or 
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. Any person wilfully 
entering or trespassing within such premises, if found within any area designated as a 
restricted area therein, shall be guilty of a violation of this section. 
(2) enters such any area designated as a restricted area therein within the 
premises described in subsection (1).  
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.3 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes supra note 
25 (September 14, 2018). 
417. Id. 
418. Id. 
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misdemeanor penalty.419  These statutes were conformed to the Model Code 




The clear definition of criminal offenses is fundamental to the fair 
administration of criminal justice.  Mississippi has failed in this regard by 
having vague definitions of many crimes.421  Also, the Committee believed 
that no one should be convicted of a crime without having criminal intent, 
which should be clearly set out in the statute.  Mississippi fails in this regard 
also because many statutes either have no words that indicate criminal 
intent, or the references to criminal intent are obscure.422  The object of this 
series of articles is to advocate for a change in the criminal code toward 
alleviating these concerns, as well to serve as an explanation of the 
Committee’s work.  
In this article, I have explained the Committee’s proposals to define 
three areas of serious crimes that were conceived at common law to prevent 
danger to persons posed by crimes that are often related to property—arson, 
robbery and burglary.  All of these crimes have been gradually transformed 
into crimes that were more directed at protecting property, rather than 
people, while retaining the same serious felony penalties.423  Perhaps of 
most concern is that all three of these crimes are commonly crimes that 
 
419. § 221.4 Trespass enhanced penalties for willful and malicious trespass 
upon airport operations area 
(1)  Any person who shall be guilty of a willful or malicious trespass 
upon the real or personal property of another, for which no other 
penalty is prescribed, shall, upon conviction, be fined not exceeding 
Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00), or imprisoned not longer than six (6) 
months in the county jail, or both. 
(a) Any person who shall willfully knowingly trespass upon any air 
operations area or sterile area of an airport serving the general public 
shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. and, upon conviction, shall 
be fined not more than One Thousand Dollars ($ 1,000.00) or 
imprisoned in the county jail for up to one (1) year, or both. 
(b)  For the purposes of this subsection (1), "air operations area" means 
a portion of an airport designed and used for landing, taking off, or 
surface maneuvering of airplanes; "sterile area" means an area to which 
access is controlled by the inspection of persons and property in 
accordance with an approved security program. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.4 as adopted by the Committee.  Minutes supra note 
25 (September 14, 2018). 
420. See Appendix C for statutes to be repealed by Article 221.  
421. See Johnson, supra note 1, at discussion accompanying notes 67-72. 
422. See id.  
423. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 220 cmt. at 4-5 (AM. LAW INST. 1980).  
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form the basis for a charge of felony murder, which is also usually eligible 
for the death penalty.424  The goal of the Model Code, which was endorsed 
by the Committee, was to return these crimes to their original purpose of 
protecting people from danger.  Protecting property, while an important 
goal of the criminal justice system, should nevertheless be secondary and 




424. See Johnson, supra note 1, at V.B. 1. c. ii-iii.  
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Appendix A 
 
Mississippi arson and related statutes that would be repealed. 
 
§ 97-17-1. Arson; first degree; burning dwelling house or outbuilding. 
(1) Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns 
or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning 
of any dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant, or 
any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is parcel 
thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto, or any state-supported 
school building in this state whether the property of himself or of 
another, shall be guilty of arson in the first degree, and upon 
conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than 
five (5) nor more than twenty (20) years and shall pay restitution for 
any damage caused. 
(2) Any person convicted under this section shall be subject to treble 
damages for any damage caused by such person. 
(3) Any property used in the commission of the offense of arson in 
the first degree shall be subject to forfeiture as provided in Section 
97-17-4. 
 
§ 97-17-3. Arson; first degree; place of worship; failure to report accidental 
fires; juvenile offenders. 
(1) Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to, or burns, 
or causes to be burned, or who is a party to destruction by explosion 
from combustible material, who aids, counsels, or procures the 
burning or destruction of any church, temple, synagogue or other 
established place of worship, whether in use or vacant, shall be 
guilty of arson in the first degree and, upon conviction therefor, 
shall be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than five (5) nor 
more than thirty (30) years and shall pay restitution for any damage 
caused. 
(2) Any person observing or witnessing the destruction by fire of 
any state-supported school building or any church, temple, 
synagogue or other established place of worship, whether occupied 
or vacant, which fire was the result of his or her act of an accidental 
nature, and who willfully fails to sound the general alarm or report 
such fire to the local fire department or other local authorities, shall 
be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction therefor, shall be 
sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than two (2) nor more than 
ten (10) years and shall pay restitution for any damage caused. 
(3) Any person, who by reason of his age comes under the 
jurisdiction of juvenile authorities and who is found guilty under 
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subsection (1) of this section, shall not be eligible for probation 
unless and until at least six (6) months’ confinement has been served 
in a state reform school. 
(4) Any person convicted under this section shall be subject to treble 
damages for any damage caused by such person. 
(5) Any property used in the commission of arson in the first degree 
shall be subject to forfeiture as provided in Section 97-17-4. 
 
§ 97-17-5. Arson; second degree; other buildings or structures. 
Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or 
causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the burning 
of any building or structure of whatsoever class or character, 
whether the property of himself or of another, not included or 
described in Section 97-17-1 or Section 97-17-3, shall be guilty of 
arson in the second degree, and upon conviction thereof, be 
sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than ten 
years. 
 
§ 97-17-7. Arson; third degree; personal property. 
Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or 
causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the burning 
of any personal property of whatsoever class or character; (such 
property being of the value of twenty-five dollars and the property 
of another person), shall be guilty of arson in the third degree and 
upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less 
than one nor more than three years. 
 
§ 97-17-9. Arson; fourth degree; attempt to burn. 
(1) Any person who wilfully and maliciously attempts to set fire to 
or attempts to burn or to aid, counsel or procure the burning of any 
of the buildings or property mentioned in the foregoing sections, or 
who commits any act preliminary thereto, or in furtherance thereof, 
shall be guilty of arson in the fourth degree and upon conviction 
thereof be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than one nor 
more than two years or fined not to exceed one thousand dollars. 
(2) The placing or distributing of any flammable, explosive or 
combustible material or substance, or any device in any building or 
property mentioned in the foregoing sections in an arrangement or 
preparation with intent to eventually, wilfully and maliciously set 
fire to or burn same, or to procure the setting fire to or burning of 
same shall, for the purposes of this section constitute an attempt to 
burn such building or property. 
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§ 97-17-11. Arson; insured property. 
Any person who wilfully and with intent to injure or defraud the 
insurer sets fire to or burns or attempts so to do or who causes to be 
burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any 
building, structure or personal property, of whatsoever class or 
character, whether the property of himself or of another, which shall 
at the time be insured by any person, company or corporation 
against loss or damage by fire, shall be guilty of a felony and upon 
conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than 
one (1) nor more than ten (10) years. 
 
§ 97-17-13. Arson; willfully or negligently firing woods, marsh, meadow, 
etc.; restitution of fire suppression costs. 
(1) If any person willfully, maliciously, and feloniously sets on fire 
any woods, meadow, marsh, field or prairie, not his own, he is guilty 
of a felony and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to the State 
Penitentiary for not more than two (2) years nor less than one (1) 
year, or fined not less than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) nor 
more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or both, in the 
discretion of the court. 
(2)  
(a) If any person recklessly or with gross negligence causes 
fire to burn any woods, meadow, marsh, field or prairie, not 
his own, he is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, on 
conviction, be fined not less than One Hundred Dollars 
($100.00) nor more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or 
imprisoned in the county jail not more than three (3) months, 
or both, in the discretion of the court. 
(b) If a person has a brush or debris pile or other material 
which is or was being burned and reasonable and prudent 
efforts were not taken to prevent the spread of the fire onto 
the lands of another shall be evidence that such person 
recklessly or with gross negligence caused the land to burn. 
(3) In addition to the penalties provided in this section, upon 
conviction, a person shall be ordered to reimburse and pay in 
restitution directly to any organized fire suppression agency 
recognized by the Mississippi Forestry Commission all the costs the 
agency incurred related to the suppression and abatement of the fire. 
 
§ 97-17-4. Forfeiture of property used in commission of arson. 
(1) All property, real or personal, including money, used in the 
course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized 
through, conduct in violation of a provision of Section 97-17-
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1 or 97-17-3 is subject to civil forfeiture to the state pursuant to the 
provisions of this section; provided, however, that a forfeiture of 
personal property encumbered by a bona fide security interest or 
real property encumbered by a bona fide mortgage, deed of trust, 
lien or encumbrance of record shall be subject to the interest of the 
secured party or subject to the interest of the holder of the mortgage 
deed of trust, lien of encumbrance of record if such secured party or 
holder neither had knowledge of or consented to the act or omission. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture may be seized by law enforcement 
officers upon process issued by any appropriate court having 
jurisdiction over the property. Seizure without process may be made 
if: 
(a) The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a 
search warrant or an inspection under a lawful 
administrative inspection; 
(b) The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a 
prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction 
or forfeiture proceeding based upon this section. 
(3) When any property is seized pursuant to this section, 
proceedings under this section shall be instituted promptly. 
(4)  
(a) A petition for forfeiture shall be filed promptly in the 
name of the State of Mississippi with the clerk of the circuit 
court of the county in which the seizure is made. A copy of 
such petition shall be served upon the following persons by 
service of process in the same manner as in civil cases: 
(i) The owner of the property, if address is known; 
(ii) Any secured party who has registered his lien or 
filed a financing statement as provided by law, if the 
identity of such secured party can be ascertained by 
the state by making a good faith effort to ascertain 
the identity of such secured party as described in 
paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of this subsection; 
(iii) Any other bona fide lienholder or secured party 
or other person holding an interest in the property in 
the nature of a security interest of whom the state has 
actual knowledge; 
(iv) A holder of a mortgage, deed of trust, lien or 
encumbrance of record, if the property is real estate 
by making a good faith inquiry as described in 
paragraph (g) of this section; and 
(v) Any person in possession of property subject to 
forfeiture at the time that it was seized. 
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(b) If the property is a motor vehicle susceptible of titling 
under the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Title Law and if there 
is any reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle has been 
titled, the state shall make inquiry of the State Tax 
Commission as to what the records of the State Tax 
Commission show as to who is the record owner of the 
vehicle and who, if anyone, holds any lien or security 
interest which affects the vehicle. 
(c) If the property is a motor vehicle and is not titled in the 
State of Mississippi, then the state shall attempt to ascertain 
the name and address of the person in whose name the 
vehicle is licensed, and if the vehicle is licensed in a state 
which has in effect a certificate of title law, the state shall 
make inquiry of the appropriate agency of that state as to 
what the records of the agency show as to who is the record 
owner of the vehicle and who, if anyone, holds any lien, 
security interest, or other instrument in the nature of a 
security device which affects the vehicle. 
(d) If the property is of a nature that a financing statement is 
required by the laws of this state to be filed to perfect a 
security interest affecting the property and if there is any 
reasonable cause to believe that a financing statement 
covering the security interest has been filed under the laws 
of this state, the state shall make inquiry of the appropriate 
office designated in Section 75-9-501 as to what the records 
show as to who is the record owner of the property and who, 
if anyone, has filed a financing statement affecting the 
property. 
(e) If the property is an aircraft or part thereof and if there is 
any reasonable cause to believe that an instrument in the 
nature of a security device affects the property, then the state 
shall make inquiry of the administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration as to what the records of the 
administrator show as to who is the record owner of the 
property and who, if anyone, holds an instrument in the 
nature of a security device which affects the property. 
(f) In the case of all other personal property subject to 
forfeiture, if there is any reasonable cause to believe that an 
instrument in the nature of a security device affects the 
property, then the state shall make a good faith inquiry to 
identify the holder of any such instrument. 
(g) If the property is real estate, the state shall make inquiry 
at the appropriate places to determine who is the owner of 
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record and who, if anyone is a holder of a bona fide 
mortgage, deed of trust, lien or encumbrance. 
(h) In the event the answer to an inquiry states that the record 
owner of the property is any person other than the person 
who was in possession of it when it was seized, or states that 
any person holds any lien, encumbrance, security interest, 
other interest in the nature of a security interest, mortgage or 
deed of trust which affects the property, the state shall cause 
any record owner and also any lienholder, secured party, 
other person who holds an interest in the property in the 
nature of a security interest, or holder of an encumbrance, 
mortgage or deed of trust which affects the property to be 
named in the petition of forfeiture and to be served with 
process in the same manner as in civil cases. 
(i) If the owner of the property cannot be found and served 
with a copy of the petition of forfeiture, or if no person was 
in possession of the property subject to forfeiture at the time 
that it was seized and the owner of the property is unknown, 
the state shall file with the clerk of the court in which the 
proceeding is pending an affidavit to such effect, whereupon 
the clerk of the court shall publish notice of the hearing 
addressed to “the Unknown Owner of ,” filling in the blank 
space with a reasonably detailed description of the property 
subject to forfeiture. Service by publication shall contain the 
other requisites prescribed in Section 11-33-41, and shall be 
served as provided in Section 11-33-37 for publication of 
notice for attachments at law. 
(j) No proceedings instituted pursuant to the provisions of 
this article shall proceed to hearing unless the judge 
conducting the hearing is satisfied that this section has been 
complied with. Any answer received from an inquiry 
required by paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section shall 
be introduced into evidence at the hearing. 
(5)  
(a) An owner of property that has been seized shall file a 
verified answer within twenty (20) days after the completion 
of service of process. If no answer is filed, the court shall 
hear evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture and 
forfeit the property to the state. If an answer is filed, a time 
for hearing on forfeiture shall be set within thirty (30) days 
of filing the answer or at the succeeding term of court if 
court would not be in progress within thirty (30) days after 
filing the answer. Provided, however, that upon request by 
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the state or the owner of the property, the court may 
postpone said forfeiture hearing to a date past the time any 
criminal action is pending against said owner. 
(b) If the owner of the property has filed a verified answer 
denying that the property is subject to forfeiture, then the 
burden is on the state to prove that the property is subject to 
forfeiture. The burden of proof placed upon the state shall 
be clear and convincing proof. However, if no answer has 
been filed by the owner of the property, the petition for 
forfeiture may be introduced into evidence and is prima 
facie evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture. 
(c) At the hearing any claimant of any right, title, or interest 
in the property may prove his lien, encumbrance, security 
interest, other interest in the nature of a security interest, 
mortgage or deed of trust to be bona fide and created without 
knowledge or consent that the property was to be used so as 
to cause the property to be subject to forfeiture. 
(d) If it is found that the property is subject to forfeiture, then 
the judge shall forfeit the property to the state. However, if 
proof at the hearing discloses that the interest of any bona 
fide lienholder, secured party, other person holding an 
interest in the property in the nature of a security interest or 
any holder of a bona fide encumbrance, mortgage or deed of 
trust is greater than or equal to the present value of the 
property, the court shall order the property released to him. 
If such interest is less than the present value of the property 
and if the proof shows that the property is subject to 
forfeiture, the court shall order the property forfeited to the 
state. 
(6)  
(a) All personal property, including money, which is 
forfeited to the state and is not capable of being sold at 
public auction shall be liquidated and the proceeds, after 
deduction of all storage and court costs, shall be forwarded 
to the State Treasurer and deposited in the General Fund of 
the state. 
(b) All real estate which is forfeited to the state shall be sold 
to the highest bidder at a public auction to be conducted by 
the state at such place, on such notice and in accordance with 
the same procedure, as far as practicable, as is required in 
the case of sales of land under execution of law. The 
proceeds of such sale shall first be applied to the cost and 
expense in administering and conducting such sale, then to 
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the satisfaction of all mortgages, deeds of trusts, liens and 
encumbrances of record on such property. All proceeds in 
excess of the amount necessary for the cost of the sale of 
such land and the satisfaction of any liens thereon shall be 
deposited in the General Fund of the State Treasury. 
(c) All other property that has been seized by the state and 
that has been forfeited shall, except as otherwise provided, 
be sold at a public auction for cash by the state to the highest 
and best bidder after advertising the sale for at least once 
each week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the last notice to 
appear not more than ten (10) days nor less than five (5) days 
prior to such sale, in a newspaper having a general 
circulation throughout the State of Mississippi. Such notices 
shall contain a description of the property to be sold and a 
statement of the time and place of sale. It shall not be 
necessary to the validity of such sale either to have the 
property present at the place of sale or to have the name of 
the owner thereof stated in such notice. The proceeds of the 
sale shall be delivered to the circuit clerk and shall be 
disposed of as follows: 
(i) To any bona fide lienholder, secured party, or 
other party holding an interest in the property in the 
nature of a security interest, to the extent of his 
interest; and 
(ii) The balance, if any, after deduction of all storage 
and court costs, shall be forwarded to the State 
Treasurer and deposited with and used as general 
funds of the state. 
(ii) The balance, if any, after deduction of all storage 
and court costs, shall be forwarded to the State 
Treasurer and deposited with and used as general 
funds of the state. 
(d) The State Tax Commission shall issue a certificate of 
title to any person who purchases property under the 
provisions of this section when a certificate of title is 
required under the laws of this state. 
 
§ 97-17-14. Aggravated assault upon fire fighter, law enforcement officer 
or emergency medical personnel by injury-causing arson. 
Any person or persons who willfully, feloniously and maliciously 
set fire to or burn or cause to be burned or who aid, counsel or 
procure the burning of any commercial or residential building, 
whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant or any kitchen, shop, barn, 
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stable, outhouse, vehicle, or wood, meadow, marsh, field or prairie, 
whether the property of the person or persons setting the fire or of 
another, and thereby cause serious bodily injury to a firefighter, law 
enforcement officer or any emergency medical personnel while said 
firefighter, law enforcement officer or emergency personnel is 
acting within the scope of his duty and office, whether said injury 
shall be intentional or unintentional, shall be guilty of aggravated 
assault and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of 
not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years in the Penitentiary or 
by both such fine and imprisonment. 
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Appendix B 
 
Mississippi Robbery and related statutes that would be repealed.  
 
§ 97-3-73. Robbery; definition. 
Every person who shall feloniously take the personal property of 
another, in his presence or from his person and against his will, by 
violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of some 
immediate injury to his person, shall be guilty of robbery. 
 
§ 97-3-75. Robbery; penalty. 
Every person convicted of robbery shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not more than fifteen 
years. 
 
§ 97-3-77. Robbery; threat to injure person or relative at another time. 
Every person who shall feloniously take the personal property of 
another, in his presence or from his person, which shall have been 
delivered or suffered to be taken through fear of some injury 
threatened to be inflicted at some different time to his person or 
property, or to the person of any member of his family or relative, 
which fear shall have been produced by the threats of the person so 
receiving or taking such property, shall be guilty of robbery. 
 
§ 97-3-79. Robbery; use of deadly weapon. 
Every person who shall feloniously take or attempt to take from the 
person or from the presence the personal property of another and 
against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person 
in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a 
deadly weapon shall be guilty of robbery and, upon conviction, shall 
be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the penalty is so 
fixed by the jury; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty 
at imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary the court shall fix 
the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term 
not less than three (3) years. 
 
§ 97-3-81. Robbery; threatening letter demanding money, property. 
Every person who shall knowingly send or deliver, or shall make, 
and, for the purpose of being sent or delivered, shall part with the 
possession of any letter or writing with or without a name 
subscribed thereto, or signed with a fictitious name, or with any 
letter, mark, or other designation, threatening therein to accuse any 
person of a crime or to do any injury to the person or property of 
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any one, with a view or intent to extort or gain money or property 
of any description belonging to another, shall be guilty of an attempt 
to rob, and shall, on conviction be punished by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary not exceeding five years. 
 
§ 97-3-115. Mississippi Carjacking Act; definitions. 
The following words and phrases shall have the meanings ascribed herein 
unless the context clearly indicates otherwise: 
(a) “Carjacking” means taking of a motor vehicle from another 
person’s immediate actual possession knowingly or recklessly by 
force or violence, whether against resistance or by sudden or 
stealthy seizure or snatching, or by putting in fear, or attempting to 
do so, or by any other means. 
(b) “Motor vehicle” includes every device in, upon or by which any 
person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a 
highway, which is self-propelled. 
 
§ 97-3-117. Mississippi Carjacking Act; what constitutes offense of 
carjacking; attempted carjacking; armed carjacking; penalties. 
(1) Whoever shall knowingly or recklessly by force or violence, 
whether against resistance or by sudden or stealthy seizure or 
snatching, or by putting in fear, or attempting to do so, or by any 
other means shall take a motor vehicle from another person’s 
immediate actual possession shall be guilty of carjacking. 
(a) A person who is convicted of carjacking shall be fined 
not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and be 
committed to the custody of the State Department of 
Corrections for not more than fifteen (15) years. 
(b) A person who is convicted of attempted carjacking shall 
receive the same punishment as the person who is convicted 
of carjacking. 
(2) Whoever commits the offense of carjacking while armed with or 
having readily available any pistol or other firearm or imitation 
thereof or other dangerous or deadly weapon, including a sawed-off 
shotgun, shotgun, machine gun, rifle, dirk, bowie knife, butcher 
knife, switchblade, razor, blackjack, billy, or metallic or other false 
knuckles, or any object capable of inflicting death or serious bodily 
harm, shall be guilty of armed carjacking. 
(a) Any person who is convicted of armed carjacking shall 
be fined not more than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) 
and be committed to the custody of the State Department of 
Corrections for not more than thirty (30) years. 
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(b) Any person who is convicted of attempted armed 
carjacking shall receive the same punishment as the person 
who is convicted of armed carjacking. 
(3) Any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense under 
this section shall be fined an amount up to twice that otherwise 
authorized and shall be imprisoned for a term up to twice the term 
otherwise authorized. 
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Appendix C 
 
Mississippi burglary and related statutes that would be repealed. 
 
§ 97-17-23. Burglary; breaking and entering inhabited dwelling; home 
invasion. 
(1)  Every person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering 
the dwelling house or inner door of such dwelling house of another, 
whether armed with a deadly weapon or not, and whether there shall 
be at the time some human being in such dwelling house or not, with 
intent to commit some crime therein, shall be punished by 
commitment to the custody of the Department of Corrections for not 
less than three (3) years nor more than twenty-five (25) years. 
(2)  Every person who shall be convicted of violating subsection (1) 
under circumstances likely to terrorize any person who is actually 
occupying the house at the time of the criminal invasion of the 
premises shall be punished by imprisonment in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections for not less than ten (10) years nor more 
than twenty-five (25) years. 
 
§ 97-17-25. Burglary; breaking out of dwelling. 
Every person who, being in the dwelling house of another, shall 
commit a crime, and shall break any outer door, or any other part of 
said house, to get out of the same, shall be guilty of burglary, and 
be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten years 
 
§ 97-17-29. Burglary; breaking inner door of dwelling by one lawfully in 
house. 
Every person who, being lawfully in the dwelling house of another, 
shall break an inner door of the same house, with intent to commit 
a crime, shall be guilty of burglary, and imprisoned in the 
penitentiary not more than ten years. 
 
§ 97-17-31. Burglary; dwelling house defined. 
Every building joined to, immediately connected with, or being part 
of the dwelling house, shall be deemed the dwelling house 
 
§ 97-17-33. Burglary; breaking and entering building other than dwelling; 
railroad car; vessels; automobiles. 
(1)  Every person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering, 
in the day or night, any shop, store, booth, tent, warehouse, or other 
building or private room or office therein, water vessel, commercial 
or pleasure craft, ship, steamboat, flatboat, railroad car, automobile, 
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truck or trailer in which any goods, merchandise, equipment or 
valuable thing shall be kept for use, sale, deposit, or transportation, 
with intent to steal therein, or to commit any felony, or who shall be 
convicted of breaking and entering in the day or night time, any 
building within the curtilage of a dwelling house, not joined to, 
immediately connected with or forming a part thereof, shall be 
guilty of burglary, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than 
seven (7) years. 
(2)  Any person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering a 
church, synagogue, temple or other established place of worship 
with intent to commit some crime therein shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary not more than fourteen (14) years. 
 
§ 97-17-37. Burglary; with explosives. 
Any person, who, with intent to commit crime, breaks and enters, 
either by day or by night, any building, whether inhabited or not, 
and opens or attempts to open any vault, safe or other secure place 
by the use of nitroglycerine, dynamite, gunpowder or any other 
explosive, shall be deemed guilty of burglary with explosives. 
Any person duly convicted of burglary with explosives shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a term of not 
less than five (5) years nor more than forty (40) years. 
 
§ 97-17-85. Trespass; going upon enclosed land of another. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 73-13-103, if any person 
shall go upon the enclosed land of another without his consent, after 
having been notified by such person or his agent not to do so, either 
personally or by published or posted notice, or shall remain on such 
land after a request by such person or his agent to depart, he shall, 
upon conviction, be fined not more than Fifty Dollars ($ 50.00) for 
such offense. The provisions of this section shall apply to land not 
enclosed where the stock law is in force. 
 
§ 97-17-89. Trespass; destruction or carrying away of vegetation, etc. not 
amounting to larceny. 
Any person who shall enter upon the closed or unenclosed lands of 
another or of the public and who shall willfully and wantonly gather 
and unlawfully sever, destroy, carry away or injure any trees, 
shrubs, flowers, moss, grain, turf, grass, hay, fruits, nuts or 
vegetables thereon, where such action shall not amount to larceny, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined 
not exceeding five hundred dollars ($ 500.00), or be imprisoned not 
exceeding six (6) months in the county jail, or both; and a verdict of 
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guilty of such action may be rendered under an indictment for 
larceny, if the evidence shall not warrant a verdict of guilty of 
larceny, but shall warrant a conviction under this section. 
 
§ 97-17-93. Entering lands of another without permission; enforcement; 
relation to other statutes; dismissal of prosecution. 
(1)  Any person who knowingly enters the lands of another without 
the permission of or without being accompanied by the landowner 
or the lessee of the land, or the agent of such landowner or lessee, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be 
punished for the first offense by a fine of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($ 250.00). Upon conviction of any person for a second or 
subsequent offense, the offenses being committed within five (5) 
years of the last offense, such person shall be punished by a fine of 
Five Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00), and may be imprisoned in the 
county jail for a period of not less than ten (10) nor more than thirty 
(30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. This section shall 
not apply to the landowner's or lessee's family, guests, or agents, to 
a surveyor as provided in Section 73-13-103, or to persons entering 
upon such lands for lawful business purposes. 
(2)   
(a) It shall be the duty of sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables 
and conservation officers to enforce this section. 
(b)  Such officers shall enforce this section by issuing a 
citation to those charged with trespassing under this section. 
(3)  The provisions of this section are supplementary to the 
provisions of any other statute of this state. 
(4)  A prosecution under the provisions of this section shall be 
dismissed upon the request of the landowner, lessee of the land or 
agent of such landowner or lessee, as the case may be. 
 
§ 97-17-95. Trespass; entry on premises where atomic machinery, rockets 
and other dangerous devices are manufactured, etc. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to wilfully enter or trespass 
within the premises of any person, firm or corporation 
manufacturing or constructing or erecting or assembling or 
maintaining or repairing or operating any nuclear powered 
machinery, equipment or vessels, or rockets, missiles, propulsion 
systems, explosives or other dangerous devices, or parts thereof, 
with the intent to commit any crime under the laws of this state, or 
of the United States, or pursuant to a conspiracy to commit any such 
crime or in an attempt to commit any such crime. Any person 
convicted of a violation of this section shall be adjudged guilty of a 
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felony, and punished by a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars 
($ 5,000.00) or by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not to 
exceed five (5) years, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the 
discretion of the court. Any person wilfully entering or trespassing 
within such premises, if found within any area designated as a 
restricted area therein, shall be guilty of a violation of this section.] 
 
§ 97-17-97. Trespass; going into or upon, or remaining in or upon, 
buildings, premises or lands of another after being forbidden to do so. 
(1)  Except as otherwise provided in Section 73-13-103, if any 
person or persons shall without authority of law go into or upon or 
remain in or upon any building, premises or land of another, 
including the premises of any public housing authority after having 
been banned from returning to the premises of the housing 
authority, whether an individual, a corporation, partnership, or 
association, or any part, portion or area thereof, after having been 
forbidden to do so, either orally or in writing including any sign 
hereinafter mentioned, by any owner, or lessee, or custodian, or 
other authorized person, or by the administrators of a public housing 
authority regardless of whether or not having been invited onto the 
premises of the housing authority by a tenant, or after having been 
forbidden to do so by such sign or signs posted on, or in such 
building, premises or land, or part, or portion, or area thereof, at a 
place or places where such sign or signs may be reasonably seen, 
such person or persons shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon 
conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five 
Hundred Dollars ($ 500.00) or by confinement in the county jail not 
exceeding six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
(2)  The provisions of this section are supplementary to the 
provisions of any other statute of this state. 
 
§ 97-17-99. Trespass; inciting or soliciting etc., persons to go into or upon, 
or remain in or upon, buildings, premises or lands of another. 
(1)  If any person or persons shall incite, or solicit, or urge, or 
encourage, or exhort, or instigate, or procure any other person or 
persons to go into or upon or to remain in or upon any building, or 
premises, or land of another whether an individual, a corporation, 
partnership, or association, or any part, portion or area thereof, 
knowing such other person or persons to have been forbidden, either 
orally or in writing including any sign hereinafter mentioned, to do 
so by any owner, or lessee, or custodian, or other authorized person, 
or knowing such other person or persons to have been forbidden to 
do so by a sign or signs posted in or upon such building, or premises, 
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or land, or part, or portion thereof, at a place or places where it or 
they may be reasonably seen, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and 
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than 
five hundred dollars ($ 500.00) or by confinement in the county jail 
not exceeding six (6) months, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
(2)  The provisions of this section are supplementary to the 
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